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COMMENTS
GUILTY PLEAS IN ILLINOIS-
THE ENIGMA OF SUBSTANTIAL COMPLIANCE
On September 1, 1970, a more detailed procedure specifying the re-
quirements Illinois trial judges must follow in accepting pleas of guilty
became effective. The method, embodied in a supreme court rule, re-
quires that the trial judge give the defendant specific admonitions and
make certain specific findings. The purpose of this Comment is to ob-
jectively portray the present state of this process, discuss and analyze
the opinions and attitudes of those charged with the responsibility of its
implementation, and make relevant criticisms and suggestions.
Illinois Supreme Court Rule 4021 superseded the former Rule 401,
paragraph (b), which previously dealt with pleas of guilty. As pointed
out in the Committee Comments to Rule 402,2 the expanded and more
specific treatment of guilty pleas required by Rule 402 resulted essen-
tially for two reasons. The first of these reasons was the holding of the
United States Supreme Court in Boykin v. Alabama,3 a decision which
had a significant impact on guilty plea procedures. In Boykin, the pe-
titioner pleaded guilty to five robbery indictments. The record lacked
any indication that the judge questioned the petitioner or that the pe-
titioner addressed the court. Under Alabama law, punishment on a
plea of guilty was to be fixed by a jury trial. The state presented eye-
witness testimony and cursorily cross-examined the petitioner. The pe-
titioner did not testify; no evidence as to his character and background
was presented; and there was no indication that the petitioner had a
prior criminal record. The jury found the petitioner guilty on each in-
dictment and sentenced him to death. The Court held that acceptance
of a guilty plea in state criminal proceedings without an affirmative show-
ing in the record that the defendant voluntarily and intelligently en-
1. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 110A, § 402 (1971). Rule 402 was adopted in June,
1970, and became effective as of September 1, 1970. Paragraph (e) was amended,
effective September 17, 1970. For the full text of the rule see Appendix A, pp.
93-94 supra.
2. See ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. l1l0A, § 402 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1974).
3. 395 U.S. 238 (1969).
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tered his plea of guilty is a violation of due process. The Court stated:
Several federal constitutional rights are involved in a waiver that takes
place when a plea of guilty is entered in a state criminal trial. First, is
the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination guaranteed by the Fifth
Amendment and applicable to the States by reason of the Fourteenth.
Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1. Second, is the right to trial by jury. Dun-
can v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145. Third, is the right to confront one's ac-
cusers. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400. We cannot presume a waiver of
these three important federal rights from a silent record.
What is at stake for an accused facing death or imprisonment de-
mands the utmost solicitude of which courts are capable in cavassing the
matter with the accused to make sure he has a full understanding of what
the plea connotes and of its consequence. When the judge discharges that
function, he leaves a record adequate for any review that may be later
sought . . . and forestalls the spin-off of collateral proceedings that seek
to probe murky memories. 4
The holding in Boykin now incorporated in Rule 402, was not satisfied
by the prior Rule 401(b),5 and, therefore, a change in Rule 401(b) was
required.
The second reason for adoption of Rule 402 was the increased atten-
tion given to guilty pleas which resulted from negotiations betweeen the
prosecutor and defense counsel. While "plea bargaining" was generally
considered appropriate, the concealment of such procedures behind an
in-court ceremony was looked upon with disfavor. The American Bar
Association, for example, stated:
4. Id. at 243-44 (citations omitted).
5. While Illinois, at the time of the Boykin decision, was one of the few states
which required that an effective waiver of the right to plead not guilty affirmatively
appear in the record, Rule 401(b) did not call for the court to place on the record
the waiver of the "three important federal rights" mentioned in Boykin. See ILL.
REv. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 113-1 to 114-14 (1969). Rule 401(b) reads as follows:
Procedure on Plea or Waiver. The court shall not permit a plea of guilty
or waiver of indictment or of counsel by any person accused of a crime
for which, upon conviction, the punishment may be imprisonment in the
penitentiary, unless the court finds from proceedings had in open court at
the time waiver is sought to be made or plea of guilty entered, or both,
as the case may be, that the accused understands he has a right to be held
to answer for the offense on indictment by a grand jury and has under-
standingly waived that right and consented to his prosecution by informa-
tion, that he understands the nature of the charge against him, and the
consequences thereof if found guilty, and understands he has a right to
counsel, and understandingly waives that right. The inquiries of the court,
and the answers of the accused to determine whether he understands his
rights to be indicted by a grand jury and to be represented by counsel and
comprehends the nature of the crime with which he is charged and the
punishment thereof fixed by law, shall be taken and transcribed and filed
in the case. The transcript, when filed, becomes a part of the common
law record in the case.
ILL. REv. STAT. ch. l10A, § 401(b) (1969).
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At the more formal part of the pleading process, the in-court appearance
at which the defendant enters his plea, the parties typically act as if no
prior negotiations had occurred. Trial judges, although they are aware
that negotiation for pleas is a common practice, routinely ask the defend-
ant whether any promises have been made to him. Notwithstanding the
fact that the plea has been the subject of negotiation, the defendant usually
answers in the negative, and the prosecutor and defense counsel seldom in-
dicate to the contrary . . . . As a result, the negotiations process remains
largely invisible, informal, and not subject to any systematic control.6
Rule 402 deals with this situation as suggested in the ABA Standards,7
by giving formal recognition to guilty plea agreements and by control-
ling their negotiation.8
The two major objectives of Rule 402 then, are: (1) to satisfy the re-
quirements of the Boykin decision by bringing the guilty plea procedure
in Illinois in line with the mandates expressed in the case, and (2) to
cause the Illinois guilty plea procedure to be one of openness, thereby
negating attacks on the procedure on the ground that it operates behind
closed doors without even a cursory appraisal by the court.
THE LAW OF RULE 402
The following discussion sets out in detail the present status of Rule
4029 as it has been defined and interpreted by the Illinois courts. No
attempt is made in this section to criticize or otherwise subjectively ana-
lyze the decisions relating to Rule 402, as that is the purpose of later
portions of this comment. The reason for separating the objective and
subjective discussions regarding Rule 402 is that the subjective discus-
sion will concentrate not on the whole, but only on those portions of
the rule which, in the opinion of the authors, need to be changed, either
in their express terms or in their interpretation. It was felt that by
concurrently presenting and analyzing the rule, a blurring might result
as to the present status of the rule. Clarity as to the prevailing view of
Rule 402 is a major objective of this portion of the discussion, and it
was felt that the opinions of the authors should be kept separate so as
to further that objective. With that in mind, a discussion follows of
Rule 402 as it now stands.
6. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION PROJECT ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CMIMI-
NAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING TO PLEAS OF GUILTY 61 (Approved Draft, 1968)
[hereinafter cited as ABA STANDARDS]. See also Enker, Perspectives in Plea Bar-
gaining, in THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRA-
TION OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: THE COURTS (1967).
7. ABA STANDARDS, supra note 6, at 61.
8. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110A, § 402(d) (Supp. 1974).
9. For the full text of Rule 402 see Appendix A, pp. 93-94 infra.
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The Requirement of Substantial Compliance
Rule 402 begins by providing that:
In hearings on pleas of guilty, these must be substantial compliance with
the following ...
This statement, negatively by its terms, does not hold the trial court
judge to a strict compliance standard governing the admonition. In-
stead, the trial court need only substantially comply with the prescrip-
tions of Rule 402. The difference, of course, is a significant one; how-
ever, the courts have uniformly upheld the substantial compliance stand-
ard.
In People v. Miller,10 the defendant pleaded guilty to the charge armed
robbery, and was sentenced to a prison term of three to seven years.
The defendant appealed, contending that the trial court failed to person-
ally admonish him in open court, as required by Rule 402, as to the min-
imum and maximum sentences for the offense charged. The contention
was overruled by the Appellate Court for the Second District, which
stated:
Rule 402 provides that 'there must be substantial compliance' with the pro-
cedures provided therein. The purpose of the rule, again according to the
committee comments, is to make an affirmative showing, in the record,
that a defendant voluntarily and understandingly enters his plea of guilty
before it is accepted in accordance with the guidelines established by the
Supreme Court in Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, and to give visibility
to the plea agreement process.
Certainly those goals would include a showing that the defendant has
been advised as to the range of the possible penalties for the offense of
which he stands charged. We do not agree, however, that Rule 402 re-
quires a strict, literal adherance to every term contained therein if the rec-
ord shows 'substantial compliance."'
The "substantial compliance" standard, however, is not to be construed
as a relaxation of Supreme Court Rule 402. Its effect is to allow for af-
firmance of trial court decisions involving guilty pleas where the error,
under the circumstances of the case, is not of a degree sufficient to re-
quire reversal.12  In this sense, the standard seems to operate on a basis
equivalent to the harmless error doctrine which affects other areas of
criminal law. 3
The standard is not to be construed as discretionary, and is not to be
10. 2 Ill. App. 3d 851, 277 N.E.2d 898 (2d Dist. 1972).
11. Id. at 853, 277 N.E.2d at 899.
12. See People v. Walsh, 3 Ill. App. 3d 1042, 279 N.E.2d 739 (1st Dist. 1972).
13. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 1l0A, § 615(a), the Illinois Supreme Court rule re-
lating to "insubstantial errors."
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invoked at the will of the appellate court. Substantial compliance is
not sufficient, for instance, where actual prejudice has resulted to the de-
fendant. On the other hand, however, the absence of prejudice to the
defendant does not mean that the trial court has substantially complied
with the rule. In People v. Garcia,14 the Appellate Court for the Third
District stated:
Both the rule and its avowed purpose are operative in areas where preju-
dice would be difficult to prove and where fairness may not depend on
absence of prejudice as a general rule. 15
Nevertheless, the absence of actual prejudice has been deemed of signi-
ficance in determining substantial compliance by the Third District in
People v. Hickman, 6 and, in general, "it is becoming well settled that
'substantial' rather than 'total' compliance with the requirements [of
Rule 402] is adequate in absence of any actual prejudice to the defend-
ant."17
Clearly, what is substantial compliance in each case depends entirely
on the facts and circumstances of the case. The validity of the standard
has, however, been established, seemingly, beyond attack.
Many cases determining whether there has been substantial compli-
ance with particular sections of Rule 402 will be discussed throughout
the remainder of this comment. It is important to note here, however,
the standard under which Rule 402 operates, for it is this standard which
gives flexibility to the appellate courts in their review of guilty plea
cases. It is believed that the substantial compliance standard has pre-
cluded harmony in the decisions interpreting the requirements of Rule
402,18 and these differences will be pointed out in the following sec-
tions.
Rule 402(a)
Rule 402 (a) provides:
Admonitions to Defendant. The court shall not accept a plea of guilty
without first, by addressing the defendant personally in open court, inform-
ing him of and determining that he understands the following:
(I) the nature of the charge;
14. 8 Ill. App. 3d 542, 289 N.E.2d 637 (3d Dist. 1972).
15. Id. at 543, 289 N.E.2d at 638.
16. 9 I11. App. 3d 39, 291 N.E.2d 523 (3d Dist. 1973).
17. ld. at 42, 291 N.E.2d at 525. See also People v. Roebuck, 10 Ill. App.
3d 641, 295 N.E.2d 32 (1st Dist. 1973); People v. Wintersmith, 9 Ill. App. 3d
327, 292 N.E.2d 220 (lst Dist. 1972).
18. See People v. Hickman, 9 11. App. 3d 39, 42, 291 N.,.2d 523, 525 (3d Dist.
1973).,
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(2) the minimum and maximum sentence prescribed by law, includ-
ing, when applicable, the penalty to which the defendant may
be subjected because of prior convictions or consecutive sen-
tences;
(3) that the defendant has the right to plead not guilty, or to persist
in that plea if it has already been made, or to plead guilty; and
(4) that if he pleads guilty there will not be a trial of any kind,
so that by pleading guilty he waives the right to a trial by jury
and the right to be confronted with the witnesses against
him.
Paragraph (a), then, enumerates those admonitions which must be given
to the defendant, in open court, to insure that the guilty plea is both in-
telligent and voluntary, as required by Boykin.
Personal Admonition By the Court
The initial requirement as to admonitions is that they must be given
by the court in a personal address to the defendant in open court. The
trial judge must inform the defendant of his rights and inform the de-
fendant of what rights are waived by a plea of guilty. In that a personal
admonition by the court is required, questions have arisen regarding the
adequacy of a written guilty plea form signed by the defendant. The
practice of accepting a written guilty plea form in lieu of a personal ad-
monition by the court is not acceptable and does not comply with Rule
402.
In People v. Cummings,'9 the defendant was not personally addressed
by the court after entering a plea of guilty to a charge of theft property
in excess -of $150. The State nevertheless argued that there was "sub-
stantial compliance" with Rule 402 because the record contained a
printed guilty plea form containing thirteen paragraphs, signed by the
defendant, his attorney and the judge. The Second District agreed with
the defendant that a written guilty plea form provides inadequate com-
pliance with the requirements of Rule 402. In so holding, the court
stated:
While a properly drawn form may serve as a check list for the court to
canvas the requirements of Rule 402, it cannot substitute for the duty of
the trial judge to personally address the defendant in open court. Such
substitution would perpetuate the evil which the Rule was designed to pre-
vent, i.e., contrived, rehearsed and, hence, involuntary or unintelligent
pleas.20
19. 7 Ill. App. 3d 306, 287 N.E.2d 291 (2d Dist. 1972).
20. Id. at 308, 287 N.E.2d at 293. See also People v. Alequin, 12 Ill. App. 2d
837, 839, 298 N.E.2d 723, 725 (2d Dist. 1973); People v. Leone, 7 Ill. App. 3d
392, 395, 287 N.E,2d 491, 494 (2d Dist. 1972),
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Other methods of admonishment have, however, been held to adequately
comply with Rule 402 despite the lack of a complete admonition offered
solely by the judge.
In People v. Torres, 2 1 the Second District, only five days after its deci-
sion in Cummings, held that an admonishment by the defendant's own
counsel in the presence of the judge, combined with an interrogation and
admonishment by the judge sufficiently met the requirement that the
judge shall personally address the defendant. 22
In yet another case, the Fifth District, in People v. Larrabee,23 affirmed
the defendant's conviction, based on a plea of guilty, where the assistant
state's attorney undertook a substantial portion of the admonishment in
the presence of the trial judge. Rejecting the defendant's contention that
this was insufficient compliance with Rule 402, the court stated:
[Ift is the duty of the trial court to admonish the defendant concerning
the effect and results of entering a guilty plea . . . and it should not be
delegated or allowed to go by default to either the prosecutor or the de-
fense attorney. . . . Here, [distinguishing a prior case holding that the
out of court admonition by the defendant's attorney was insufficient] the
trial court heard the explanation and the affirmation by defendant that he
understood. The entire exchange was bracketed by inquiries by the trial
court directed to the defendant and which elicited responses indicating un-
derstanding. By the manner in which the exchange of questions and
answers occurred, the trial court incorporated by reference the explanations
and admonitions offered by the assistant State's Attorney.24
The decisions in Torres and Larrabee do not, however, serve as marked
exceptions to the requirement that the trial judge personally address the
defendant. The partial admonishment by the defendant's attorney in
Torres and by the assistant state's attorney in Larrabee took place in
open court before the trial judge. Any such admonishment made out of
court would not substitute for a personal admonition by the court.
Admonition Must Be to the Defendant's Knowledge and Understanding
The trial judge must be satisfied that the defendant knows and under-
stands the admonitions given. A question has arisen, however, as to
what is the proper standard against which the defendant's understand-
The court in Cummings notes that the provision requiring the court to personally
address the defendant is patterned after Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure. See McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459 (1969), for a discussion
of the federal requirement of a personal admonition by the federal courts.
21. 7 Ill. App, 3d 395, 287 N.E.2d 487 (2d Dist. 1972).
22. Id. at 399, 287 N.E.2d at 490.
23. 7 I11. App. 3d 726, 288 N.E.2d 538 (5th Dist. 1972).
4.. .at 729, 288 N.E.2d 4t 540 (emphasis added).
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ing is to be measured. Admonitions are regarded as sufficient if they
are made in such a manner as to be understood by the reasonable per-
son in the defendant's position, i.e., with regard to the defendant's experi-
ence, education and ability to understand. The court, in People v.
Torres,25 stated:
In People v. Doyle, 20 I1.2d 163, 167, the Illinois Supreme Court stated:
'mhe remarks and advice of the court must be read in a practical and
realistic manner. The essentials have been complied with if an ordinary
person in the circumstances of the accused would understand them as con-
veying the information required by the rule . . . .' While the Doyle case
referred to the predecessor of Supreme Court Rule 402 [i.e. Rule 401
(b)], the same principle is applicable. 26
Accordingly, before admonishing the defendant, the court should inquire
into the defendant's age and education, determine whether the defendant
has ever been in a mental institution, determine whether the defendant'
is a habitual drunkard or a drug user, and make any other relevant inquiry
into the defendant's ability to understand.
Rule 402 (a) (1)-The Nature of the Charge
Under Rule 402(a)(1), the defendant must be informed of and
understand the nature of the charge. A similar requirement is set forth
in Illinois Revised Statutes, Chapter 38, Section 113-1. The United States
Supreme Court, in Smith v. O'Grady,27 stated that, "[R]eal notice of the
true nature of the charge . . . [is] the first and most universally recog-
nized requirement of due process .... ,"28 A guilty plea, which consti-
tutes an admission of all elements of the charge, thus requires that the de-
fendant know the law in relation to the facts. Rule 402, however, re-
quires no specific procedure, and the most appropriate procedure for
the judge varies from case to case, as the following discussion indi-
cates.
In People v. Trenter,29 the trial court stated to the defendant that he
was charged with "burglary," and went no further. The Second Dis-
trict affirmed the defendant's conviction, holding that an admonishment
as to the nature of the charge is sufficient where the trial judge simply
states the name of the charge. 30
25. 7 Ill. App. 3d 395, 287 N.E.2d 487 (2d Dist. 1972).
26. Id. at 399, 287 N.E.2d at 490. See also People v. Gardner, 8 Ill. App. 3d
588, 591, 289 N.E.2d 638, 641 (5th Dist. 1972).
27. 312 U.S. 329 (1941).
28. Id. at 334. See also McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459 (1969); Peo-
ple v. Ingeneri, 7 Il1. App. 3d 809, 288 N.E.2d 550 (5th Dist. 1972).
29. 3 Ill. App. 3d 889, 279 N.E.2d 130 (2d Dist. 1972).
30. Id. at 891, 279 N.E.2d at 132. But see People v. Billops, 16 Ill. App. 3d
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The requirement that the defendant be informed of the nature of the
charge was satisfied in People v. Warship,8' where the defendant had a
copy of the indictment and the judge repeated almost all of the ele-
ments of the crime to which the defendant pled guilty.82
In People v. Hudson,3 the Appellate Court for the Fifth District, in dis-
tinguishing the requirement of Rule 402(a)(1) that the trial judge
determine that the defendant understands the "nature of the charge"
from -the requirement of Rule 402(c)34 that there be a factual basis for
the plea, stated:
The crux of the requirement of Rule 402(a)(1) is understanding. The
nature of the charge consists of two parts: (1) The acts and intent (if
any) required to constitute a violation of the provisions of the criminal
code, and (2) the alleged acts and intent (if any) with which the alleged
acts were committed which are attributed to the defendant in the particular
case. These two parts should be explained by the judge to the defendant
in open court in laymen's terms. The judge should proceed no further un-
til he is completely satisfied from the defendant's personal remarks in open
court that he understands the explanation.' 5
On the same day the Fifth District decided Hudson, it also stated,
in People v. lngeneri,'6 that simply supplying the defendant with a copy
of the indictment was insufficient to inform the defendant of the na-
ture of the charge. Nevertheless, the court suggested that reading the in-
dictment to the defendant may be sufficient under the circumstances of
the particular case. The court stated:
Rule 402(a)(1) requires the court to do more than just inform the de-
fendant of the charge; it also requires the trial judge to inform the defend-
892, 307 N.E.2d 206 (5th Dist. 1974), where the court held that simply stating the
name of the charge was insufficient even though the defendant had a copy of the
indictment.
31. 6 Ill. App. 3d 461, 285 N.E.2d 224 (2d Dist. 1972).
32. The Appellate Court for the Second District relied primarily on People v.
McCrady, 131 Ill. App. 2d 836, 267 N.E.2d 515 (3d Dist. 1971), a case which dealt
with the predecessor to Rule 402, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. ll0A, § 401(b) (1969). In
McCrady, the trial judge stated only that the defendant was charged with burglary
and then proceeded to read off the numbers of the two indictments previously fur-
nished the defendant. The court held that the defendant had been adequately ad-
monished as to the nature of the charge
since the charges of burglary were repeated specifically to him, and
since defendant had received copies of the complaints and indictments
which specifically described the nature of the acts constituting the offenses.
Id. at 840-41, 267 N.E.2d at 519.
33. 7 ll. App. 3d 800, 288 N.E.2d 533 (5th Dist. 1972).
34. See notes 85-96 and accompanying text infra for a discussion of Rule
402(c).
35. 7 Ill. App. 3d at 802, 288 N.E.2d at 535.
36. 7 Ill. App. 3d 809, 288 N.E.2d 550 (5th Dist. 1972).
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ant of the 'nature' of the charge. Since a guilty plea is an 'admission of
all the elements of a formal criminal charge' and 'cannot be truly volun-
tary unless the defendant possesses an understanding of the law in relation
to the facts,' McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, we believe the trial
court must inform the defendant of the essential elements of the crime of
which he is charged. In some cases this can be done by a reading of the
indictment to the defendant. But it should be pointed out that merely fur-
nishing a copy of the indictment to the defendant would not be sufficient
because Rule 402(a) specifically requires the trial court to address the
defendant personally in open court. Many times the indictment is
couched in technical legal language and when that is the case, we will not
assume that the defendant understands this language.
3 7
The First District, on the other hand, in People v. Wintersmith,3 8 and in
People v. Tennyson,3 9 held that informing the defendant of the nature of
the charge does not require a recitation of all the facts and the elements
therein, in that Rule 402 requires "only substantial compliance with its
provisions."4
A similar position was taken by the Second District in People v. Diaz.
41
In holding that each element of the offense charged need not be recited
by the trial judge, the court declared:
Relying on People v. Ingeneri (1972), 7 Ill.App.3d 809, 811, defendant
argues that when informing a defendant of the nature of the charge, the
court must clearly and simply state each material element of the offense
in sufficient detail to insure the defendant's ability to understand. We do
not agree that either Supreme Court Rule 402 or any constitutional pro-
vision requires each element of an offense be explained to a defendant.
Rather, in our view, the record as a whole should disclose that the defend-
ant has been advised of the "essence, general character, kind or sort" of
the offense to the extent that the particular defendant before the court de-
ciding on the options available to him has a common understanding of the
nature of the charge.
42
The Fourth District, in People v. Green,43 reversed the trial court judg-
ment on a plea of guilty when the trial court failed to explain the na-
ture of the charge. As to Rule 402(a)(1), the court stated:
Informing the defendant of the nature of the charge requires that the trial
judge by reading or paraphrasing the essential allegations of the indict-
ment, explain to the defendant the acts (and the accompanying state of
mind where applicable) which the State alleges him to have committed;
37. id. at 811, 288 N.E.2d at 551-52.
38. 9 Ill. App. 3d 327, 292 N.E.2d 220 (1st Dist. 1972).
39. 9 Inl. App. 3d 329, 292 N.E.2d 223 (lst Dist. 1972).
40. See notes 10-18 and accompanying text supra.
41. 15 Ill. App. 3d 280, 304 N.E.2d 103 (2d Dist. 1973).
42. Id. at 283, 304 N.E.2d at 106 (citations omitted).
43. 12 111. App. 3d 418, 299 N.E.2d 535 (4th Dist. 1973).
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it also requires that the court then read or paraphrase and explain to the
defendant the applicable section of the Criminal Code which proscribes
the conduct attributable to the defendant as alleged in the indictment.4 4
The Third Circuit has held that the defendant was adequately informed
of the nature of the charge against him where it was established in
open court by the defense counsel, in the presence of the defendant,
that he had gone over the information charging the defendant with mis-
demeanor theft, and that the defendant acknowledged the truth of the
information. 45
In summary, it may be concluded from the above cases that what is
required to adequately inform the defendant of the "nature of the
charge" under Rule 402(a)(1) is not subject to easy resolution. The
defendant, the charge itself, and the circumstances of the case may af-
fect the trial court's admonition. According to the case law, supplying
the defendant with the indictment or information is not sufficient, yet
reading the same may be sufficient. It is generally not required that the
court recite all of the elements of the offense charged, yet at least
one case says that such a procedure is required. According to one opinion,
the statute under which the charge is brought must be read to the defend-
ant.
If a general statement must be made, it is that the nature of the
charge must be explained to the defendant in a practical and realistic
manner, in terms understandable to the ordinary person in the defend-
ant's circumstances, in an open court procedure adequately and reason-
ably aimed at informing the defendant of the reason he is before the
court.
Rule 402 (a) (2)-The Penal Consequences
Under Rule 402(a)(2), the court must explain to the defendant
the minimum and maximum sentence to which he is subject under the
law, including, when applicable, the effect prior convictions or concur-
rent sentences may have on his sentence.46 The requirement of subpara-
44. Id. at 419-20, 299 N.E.2d at 537.
Just prior to Green, the Fourth District held that the trial court did not comply
with Rule 402(a)(1) where the trial judge simply asked whether the defendant un-
derstood, "[w]hat you're charged with in these indictments, forgery?" to which the
defendant answered, "yes." People v. Krantz, 12 Ill. App. 3d 38, 297 N.E.2d 386
(4th Dist. 1973).
45. People v. Trinka, 10 Ill. App. 3d 183, 293 N.E.2d 179 (3d Dist. 1973).
46. It is not necessary for the judge to admonish the defendant of the minimum
and maximum sentence that might be imposed at a probation revocation hearing.
See People v. Evans, 3 Ill. App. 3d 435, 278 N.E.2d 401 (2d Dist. 1972). Nor
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graph (2), that the defendant be informed of both the minimum
and maximum sentence provided by law, is a marked deviation from
Illinois Revised Statutes, Chapter 38, Section 113-4(c), which deals with
pleas in general and requires only that the court explain to the defendant
"the maximum penalty provided by law." The more complete admoni-
tion required under Rule 402(a)(2) is believed to give the defendant
"a more realistic picture of what might happen to him."'47
It is the judge's duty to personally address the defendant in open
court as to the possible sentence. The Second Districl, however, in the
case of People v. Miller,45 held that the trial judge substantially complied
with the requirements of 402(a) (2) when the assistant state's attorney
rather than the judge personally, advised the defendant of the possible
sentences applicable to an armed robbery conviction. The court rea-
soned that it is not necessary that the admonition regarding Rule 402
(a)(2) come "from the lips of the trial judge" where it is clear from the
record that the defendant has otherwise been advised as to the possible
sentence. 4
9
The substantial compliance standard, however, has not been readily
applied to the description of the possible sentence. The court in People
v. Zboralski,50 noted that the degree of compliance required to satisfy
Rule 402(a)(2) is now higher than it was at the time of the rule's
inception. Clearly, the specific minimum and maximum sentences are
required where they are easily stated. Problems arise, however, when
the maximum sentence is indeterminate. The courts generally agree that
an admonition to the effect that the sentence may be, for example,
"from two years to an indeterminate time" is insufficient.51 The belief
is it required that the judge inform the defendant as to the possible effect of a plea
of guilty on his probationary status in relation to another case. See People v. War-
ship, 6 Ill. App. 3d 461, 285 N.E.2d 224 (2d Dist. 1972). Furthermore, dicta in
People v. Dickinson, 13 Il. App. 3d 469, 300 N.E.2d 294 (4th Dist. 1973), indi-
cates that, where applicable, a first offender need not be admonished of the possibil-
ity of probation as a means of informing the defendant of the minimum sentence.
47. See Committee Comments to Rule 402, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110A, § 402
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1974).
48. 2 Ill. App. 3d 851, 277 N.E.2d 898 (2d Dist. 1972).
49. See also People v. Trinka, 10 111. App. 3d 183, 293 N.E.2d 179 (3d Dist.
1973), where, citing Miller, the Third District similarly treated an admonition as
to the applicable minimum and maximum sentence by the defendant's attorney.
Obviously, a complete failure to inform the defendant of the possible sentence is
reversible error. People v. HarI, 11 Ill. App. 3d 372, 297 N.E.2d 404 (4th Dist.
1973). An erroneous description as to the penalty may also serve as grounds for
reversal. People v. Attwood, 10 Ill. App. 3d 381, 293 N.E.2d 495 (3d Dist. 1973).
50. 15 Ill. App. 3d 343, 304 N.E.2d 484 (3d Dist. 1973).
51. See, e.g., People v. Huggins, 11 Ill. App. 3d 307, 296 N.E.2d 360 (3d Dist.
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is that such an explanation of the possible sentence may mislead the
defendant into thinking he might receive the minimum sentence or one
similar thereto. The Third District advised, in People v. Huggins,5" that
the best way to admonish the defendant, where the sentence is inde-
terminate, may be to inform the defendant that the sentence may run for a
maximum number of years, "such as 10 years or 15 years," or for some
other number of years as a maximum, which would at least be equal
to a maximum actually imposed by the court.58
The cases are divided on the question of whether the defendant must
be informed that consecutive sentences might be imposed. The First
District, in People v. Reed,54 determined that such an admonishment was
not required in that the trial judge had otherwise substantially complied
with Rule 402(a) (2). The Fourth District however, in People v. Zatz,55
distinguished Reed on the basis that, unlike the defendant in Reed, de-
fendant Zatz's plea was not as a result of negotiation. The court in
Zatz then reversed the trial court and remanded the case with direc-
tions that the defendant be allowed to plead anew.
Rule 402(a)(3)-The Defendant's Right to Plead Not Guilty56
Rule 402(a)(3) provides that the defendant must be informed that
he has the right to plead not guilty, to persist in a not guilty plea if one
has already been made, or to plead guilty.57
1973); People v. Ingeneri, 7 Ill. App. 3d 809, 288 N.E.2d 550 (5th Dist. 1972); Peo-
ple v. Terry, 44 Ill. 2d 38, 253 N.E.2d 383 (1969); People v. Short, 4 Ill. App.
3d 849, 281 N.E.2d 785 (3d Dist. 1972). But see People v. Chatmon, 14 Ill. App.
3d 807, 303 N.E.2d 470 (1st Dist. 1973) (where court otherwise advised the defend-
ant of the sentence which would actually be imposed); People v. Ehrler, 8 I1. App.
3d 912, 290 N.E.2d 406 (2d Dist. 1972) (arising under prior Rule 401(b)); People
v. Hartman, 6 Ill. App. 3d 543, 285 N.E.2d 600 (2d Dist. 1972) (substantial com-
pliance standard applied).
52. 11 Il. App. 3d 307, 296 N.E.2d 360 (3d Dist. 1973).
53. id. at 308, 295 N.E.2d at 361. See also People v. Sullivan, 12 Ill. App.
3d 394, 297 N.E.2d 586 (3d Dist. 1973) (arising under prior Rule 401(b)).
Presumably, if the court gives examples of the maximum sentence which might
'be imposed, and then sentences the defendant to a term of years greater than the
highest example given while admonishing the defendant, the defendant may still
claim that he was misled as to the potential maximum.
54. 3 111. App. 3d 293, 278 N.E.2d 524 (1st Dist. 1971).
55. 13 Ill. App. 3d 322, 300 N.E.2d 16 (4th Dist. 1973). See also People v.
Holland, 1 Ill. App. 3d 885, 275 N.E.2d 190 (5th Dist. 1971).
56. The underlying issue of the constitutionality of guilty pleas is beyond the
scope of this Comment.
Subparagraphs (3) and (4) of Rule 402(a) deal with the "three important federal
rights" enumerated in Boykin. The record must show an affirmative waiver of these
rights. See notes 2-5 and accompanying text supra.
57. See People v. L arrbee 7 ill. App. 30 776, 28 N..2d $3 (5th Disl,
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Failure to advise the defendant of the right to plead not guilty is
reversible error.58 Furthermore, the Third District, in People v. Carle,59
held that where the defendant was advised that he had a right to a trial,
but was not advised that he had a right to plead not guilty or that he
had the right to be confronted with the witnesses against him, the trial
court committed reversible error.
Rule 402(a)(4)-Waiver of Right to Trial and Right to be Confronted
With Witnesses
The trial judge, 60 under Rule 402(a)(4), is required to inform the
defendant that by pleading guilty he will not have a trial of any kind
and will be, therefore, waiving his right to a jury trial and right to be
confronted by the witnesses against him.6'
In determining that Rule 402(a)(4) comprehends advice and un-
derstanding of the waiver of the right to a trial of any kind, it has been
stated that an admonition, to the effect that the defendant waives his
right to a jury trial, need not also be accompanied by an admonish-
ment that the defendant is also waiving his right to a bench trial.6 2
The failure of the trial court to specifically admonish the defendant
of his right to be confronted with the witnesses is not a fatal error where
the judge otherwise substantially complies with Rule 402(a)(4). 63
Neither the rule nor the cases require that the defendant be admon-
ished of his right to remain silent under Rule 402(a)(4). The Second
District, in People v. Caughlin,64 stated:
1972), where the court held that it was not reversible error for the judge to allow
the State's Attorney to inform the defendant of his right to plead not guilty.
58. See People v. Holland, 1 Ill. App. 3d 885, 275 N.E.2d 190 (5th Dist.
1971). See also People v. Thompson, 10 Ill. App. 3d 455, 294 N.E.2d 104 (5th Dist.
1973) (per curiam).
59. 7 Il. App. 3d 709, 288 N.E.2d 878 (3d Dist. 1972).
60. See People v. Larrabee, 7 Ill. App. 3d 726, 288 N.E.2d 538 (5th Dist.
1972), where the court held that it was not reversible error for the trial court to
allow the State's Attorney to inform the defendant of his right to trial.
61. In People v. Alequin, 12 Ill. App. 3d 837, 298 N.E.2d 723 (2d Dist. 1973),
the Second District reversed a guilty plea conviction where the judge merely stated
that the defendant, by pleading guilty, waived his right to trial, without inquiring
of the defendant whether he wanted to waive that right.
62. People v. Holman, 12 Ill. App. 3d 307, 297 N.E.2d 752 (3d Dist. 1973)
(per curiarm). See also People v. Charles, 2 Ill. App. 3d 452, 277 N.E.2d .348 (2d
Dist. 1971).
63. See People v. Williams, 9 Ill. App. 3d 401, 292 N.E.2d 437 (1st Dist. 1972)
(abstract); People v. Augustine, 6 Ill. App. 3d 165, 284 N.E.2d 698 (2d Dist. 1972)
(abstract). But see People v. Carle, 7 Ill. App. 3d 709, 288 N.E.2d 878 (3d Dist.
1972).
64, 7 II. App. 3d 389, 287 N.E.2d 499 (2d Dist. 1972).
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The rule does not state a requirement that a defendant must be specif-
ically advised that he has the right to remain silent i.e., not to incriminate
himself, and the specific statements are not constitutionally required.
There is no requirement under Boykin v. Alabama (1969), 23 L.Ed.2d
274, 279-80 compelling specific and literal statements of all constitutional
rights of an accused involved in a waiver that takes place upon the entry
of a guilty plea.65
Finally, neither the terms "trial by jury" nor any other magic words
are required to satisfy Rule 402(a)(4). In People v. Grace,66 the
Second District decided that the trial judge sufficiently complied with
the rule where the defendant was advised that he had the right to have
his guilt or innocence determined by a jury and that he would be pre-
sumed innocent until proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.67
Rule 402 (b)-Voluntariness
Rule 402 (b) provides:
Determining Whether the Plea is Voluntary. The court shall not accept
a plea of guilty without first determining that the plea is voluntary. If
the tendered plea is the result of a plea agreement, the agreement shall
be stated in open court. The court, by questioning the defendant person-
ally in open court, shall confirm the terms of the plea agreement, or that
there is no agreement, and shall determine whether any force or threats
or any promises, apart from a plea agreement, were used to obtain the
plea.
In contrast to the practice prevailing prior to the adoption of Rule
402,68 paragraph (b) requires, inter alia, that where a tendered plea
is the result of plea negotiations, the agreement reached must be stated
in open court;69 and failure to do so is, generally, reversible error. 70
The primary effect of Rule 402 (b) is that it requires a determination
by the trial court that the guilty plea is voluntarily made. Under the
65. Id. at 390, 287 N.E.2d at 500 (citations omitted). See also People v.
Bolden, 7 111. App. 3d 730, 288 N.E.2d 541 (5th Dist. 1972), and the cases cited
therein.
66. 8 Ill. App. 3d 847, 290 N.E.2d 318 (2d Dist. 1972) (abstract).
67. See also People v. Krouse, 7 Ill. App. 3d 754, 288 N.E.2d 543 (5th Dist.
1972).
68. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110A, § 401(b) (1969).
69. See notes 6-8 and accompanying text supra; ABA STANDARDS, supra note 6,
§ 1.5 at 29.
The burden is upon the parties to have their plea agreement made of record. See
People v. Goodman, 2 I11. App. 3d 584, 277 N.E.2d 136 (2d Dist. 1971).
70. People v. Ridley, 5 111. App. 3d 680, 284 N.E.2d 37 (1st Dist. 1972). But
see People v. Talbot, 9 Ill. App. 3d 688, 292 N.E.2d 561 (3d Dist. 1973), where
the Third District held that no reversible error was committed when the court
did not make a record of the plea negotiations until after acceptance of the guilty
plea; People v. Dudley, 58 Ill. 2d 57, 316 N.E.2d 773 (1974) (the failure to comply
amounted to harmless error).
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rule, it is the duty of the court to inquire of the defendant whether any
force or threats were used against him and whether any promises were
made to him. Here again, however, the substantial compliance stand-
ard applied to Rule 402 has had an effect. In the recent appellate
court case, People v. Gibson,7 the trial judge asked the defendant
whether any "promises" were made to him for his plea of guilty, but
neglected to inquire whether any "force or threats" were used. The
Second District noted the absence of any Illinois cases involving the omis-
sion of inquiry as to force or threats as required by Rule 402 (b). Look-
ing at the entire record, the court concluded that the trial court had
substantially complied with Rule 402 and, hence, that the guilty plea
was voluntary. 72  A complete failure of the trial court to inquire as to
the voluntariness of the defendant's plea may result in the case, on ap-
peal, being remanded to the trial court for the purpose of making such
inquiry, 73 or it may require reversal. 74
Where the plea is found to be involuntary, it is void, 75 and any subse-
quent conviction based upon the plea is reversible 76 or at least subject
to collateral attack. 77
An issue of obvious importance under Rule 402(b), then, is whether
or not the defendant's guilty plea is in fact voluntary. Numerous cases
have dealt with this issue and no attempt will be made here to discuss
all of them. The important element to keep in mind, however, when
considering cases dealing with the voluntariness of a guilty plea, is
the effect of the conduct or events on the defendant's freedom of choice.
Simply because the prosecutor is responsible for some or all of the fac-
tors resulting in a plea of guilty, the plea rendered is not involuntary,
71. 11 111. App. 3d 875, 297 N.E.2d 31 (2d Dist. 1973).
72. The court did state, however, that the "better practice" would have been to
inquire into any force or threats.
73. People v. Garcia, 8 Ill. App. 3d 542, 289 N.E.2d 637 (3d Dist. 1972). But
see People v. Ellis, No. 46519 (Ill., Nov. 27, 1974).
74. People v. Attwood, 10 Il. App. 3d 381, 293 N.E.2d 495 (3d Dist. 1973)
(defendant allowed to plead anew); People v. Hendrickson, 11 Ill. App. 3d 219, 296
N.E.2d 751 (5th Dist. 1973).
75. People v. Washington, 38 I11. 2d 446, 232 N.E.2d 738 (1967).
76. People v. Cassiday, 90 I11. App. 2d 132, 232 N.E.2d 795 (3d Dist. 1967)
(per curiam). There must, however, be some cause and effect relationship between
the alleged coercive conduct and the guilty plea to justify reversal. People v. Smith,
42 111. 2d 516, 251 N.E.2d 721 (1969).
77. Machibroda v. United States, 368 U.S. 487 (1962); People v. Washington,
38 I11. 2d 446, 232 N.E.2d 738 (1967) (such collateral attack may take the form
of a post-conviction hearing). See also People v. Barr, 14 Ill. App. 3d 742, 303
N.E.2d 202 (1st Dist. 1973), where the court discussed the status of Rule 402(b)
as being of a constitutional nature.
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since the state encourages guilty pleas at each important step of the
criminal process. 78 Nor is a plea considered coerced or otherwise invol-
untary because it is influenced by the defendant's fear of an increased
sentence should he be convicted at a trial.79 In fact, the United States
Supreme Court has held that a plea of guilty may be regarded as volun-
tary even if the defendant is not willing or able to admit his participa-
tion in the alleged criminal conduct.80 In that case, the Court stated:
[W]hile most pleas of guilty consist of both a waiver of trial and an ex-
press admission of guilt, the latter element is not a constitutional requisite
to the imposition of criminal penalty. An individual accused of crime
may voluntarily, knowingly, and understandingly consent to the imposition
of a prison sentence even if he is unwilling or unable to admit his partici-
pation in the acts constituting the crime. 8 '
Earlier, the Court had stated:
The standard was and remains whether the plea represents a voluntary and
intelligent choice among the alternative courses of action open to the de-
fendant.82
On the other hand, a guilty plea may be invalidated (i.e. considered
involuntary) by a prosecutor's unfulfilled promise of a reduced sentence. 3
Similarly, a misrepresentation by the judge as to the sentence to
be imposed may render the plea involuntary.8 4
Rule 402(c)-The Factual Basis Determination
Rule 402 (c) provides:
Determining Factual Basis for Plea. The court shall not enter final judg-
ment on a plea of guilty without first determining that there is a factual
basis for the plea.
Quite apart from the question as to whether or not a plea of guilty
is voluntary is the question of whether or not there is a factual basis suf-
ficient to support the plea.
The risk that a plea which is obtained without resort to threats or other
improper inducements and which is entered with full understanding of the
78. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970).
79. Id. See also People v. Scott, 49 Ill. 2d 231, 274 N.E.2d 39 (1971) (fear
of a possible death sentence); People v. Martinez, 7 Ill. App. 3d 1075, 289 N.E.2d
76 (1st Dist. 1972) (fear of death penalty).
80. North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970). See also People v. Grant,
1 Il. App. 3d 658, 274 N.E.2d 603 (lst Dist. 1971).
81. 400 U.S. at 37.
82. Id. at 31 (citations omitted).
83. See, e.g., People v. Pier, 51 Ill. 2d 96, 281 N.E.2d 289 (1972).
84. People v. Washington, 38 Ill. 2d 446, 232 N.E.2d 738 (1967). Withdrawal
of a plea of guilty based on force, threats, or unfulfilled promises is not herein dis-
cussed.
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possible consequences might nonetheless be inaccurate . . . is a matter
of concern. The defendant may not completely understand what mental
state and acts constitute commission of the offense charged or that he has
a valid defense to the charge. A guilty plea may be entered by a psychiat-
rically disturbed person; unlike a trial of a criminal case, the brief guilty
plea process affords the judge little opportunity to detect incompetency un-
less the defendant is obviously retarded or grossly psychotic. A clearly
rational defendant may enter a false plea in the hope of achieving some
goal, as where an innocent defendant is seeking to protect another person.
These and similar situations, although rare, have been observed from time
to time.8 5
Rule 402(c) recognizes the distinction between the concerns of volun-
tariness and factual basis determinations and imposes a duty upon the trial
judge to determine whether the factual basis supports the plea. A com-
plete failure of the trial court to determine the existence of a factual basis
is reversible error.88
Two aspects of Rule 402(c) merit some discussion here. They are:
(1) the procedure to be employed in determining whether a factual
basis exists; and (2) the time when such inquiry should be made.
As far as the procedure to be used is concerned, it should be noted
initially that the rule does not require that the court set out the details
of the factual basis in the record. In People v. Doe,87 the First District
was faced with the defendant's contention that the trial court failed to
comply with Rule 402(c) by not setting out the factual basis in detail in
the record. Basing its decision on the Committee Comments to Rule 402,
which state that the factual basis inquiry may be geared to the particular
case, the court concluded that a statement in the record by the trial
judge to the effect that a factual basis did exist was a sufficient determi-
nation. Then, refusing to extend the scope of Rule 402(e), which
provides that those proceedings required by Rule 402 to be in open
85. ABA STANDARDS, supra note 6, § 1.6 at 31.
The requirement of Rule 402(c) as to determining whether a factual basis for
the plea exists is further to be considered separately from the requirement of Rule
402(a) (1) that the defendant be informed of the nature of the charge. See, e.g.,
People v. Hudson, 7 Ill. App. 3d 800, 288 N.E.2d 533 (5th Dist. 1972).
86. See, e.g., People v. Rollins, 9 Ill. App. 3d 1011, 293 N.E.2d 733 (1st Dist.
1973) (reversed and remanded with directions that defendant be allowed to plead
anew).
Rule 402(c), however, is not constitutionally mandated. See People v. Nardi, 48
Ill. 2d 111, 268 N.E.2d 389 (1971). Nor is its effect retroactive. People v. Jack-
son, 11 Ill. App.3d 933, 297 N.E.2d 195 (5th Dist. 1973). Furthermore, it is not
necessary for the trial judge to personally address the defendant in establishing the
factual basis for the plea. People v. Billops, 16 Ill. App. 3d 892, 307 N.E.2d 206
(5th Dist. 1974).
87. 6 II1. App. 3d 799, 286 N.E.2d 645 (1st Dist. 1972).
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court shall be made of record, the court held that the factual basis need
not be set out in detail in the record because the determination is not
required to be made in open court. s8
Probably the best discussion of those procedures by which the factual
basis for a guilty plea may be established is set out in People v. Hudson.89
In this case, the defendant unequivocally admitted that he did commit
the crime (armed robbery) to which he pleaded guilty. The fifth dis-
trict held that this admission provided a sufficient factual basis for con-
cluding that the defendant actually committed the crime. As to the pro-
cedure to be employed, the court stated:
Rule 402(c) does not specify any particular method of inquiry into the
factual basis of the plea. The judge may utilize any appropriate procedure
which will assure a record that demonstrates there is a factual basis for
the plea . . . . The method which should normally first be employed is
to ask the defendant if he actually committed the acts with the intent (if
any) required as set out in the indictment and as explained by the judge.
This might also be done by simply having the defendant state what he did.
If the defendant admits or states that he committed acts with the intent
(if any) required, then Rule 402(c) is complied with. If the defendant
fails or refuses to admit that he committed the crime or professes his inno-
cence, this method of inquiry alone will not produce a record which shows
compliance with Rule 402(c). But if the defendant persists in his desire
to plead guilty, his plea may still be accepted if a factual basis is otherwise
demonstrated . . . . A factual basis may otherwise be demonstrated (1)
by having the prosecuting attorney summarize the testimony he could pre-
sent to show the defendant committed the crime. ( People v. Bowers, 47
I1.2d 585, 268 N.E.2d 13, 14; People v. Dugan, supra); (2) by having
the facts stated by witness(es), (People s'. Dugan, supra); or (3) by ex-
amination of a presentence report. (People v. Dugan, supra; People v.
Nardi, 48 Ill.2d 111, 268 N.E.2d 389, 391.) If the third method is used,
the judge should state in open court the material he is relying on in
determining there is a factual basis for the plea. However, a mere per-
functory use of one of the above methods will not insulate a conviction
entered upon a plea of guilty from reversal if the record does not demon-
strate there is a factual basis for the plea. 9 0
The second important aspect of Rule 402(c) concerns the time at
88. Id. at 801, 286 N.E.2d at 646. See also People v. Price, 9 Ill. App. 3d 693,
292 N.E.2d 752 (3d Dist. 1973) (where the court noted that setting out the factual
basis would be the "better practice").
89. 7 Ill. App. 3d 800, 288 N.E.2d 533 (5th Dist. 1972).
90. Id. at 803-04, 288 N.E.2d at 535-36 (citations omitted). See also People
v. Price, 9 Ill. App. 3d 693, 292 N.E.2d 752 (3d Dist. 1973). But see People v.
Walraven, 11 Ill. App. 3d 1085, 297 N.E.2d 198 (3d Dist. 1973).
The court may accept a guilty plea although the factual basis would not convict
the defendant at a trial. People v. Hickman, 9 Ill. App. 3d 39, 291 N.E.2d 523
(3d Dist. 1973).
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which the factual basis determination should be made. Rule 402(c)
states that the court shall not enter a final judgment on a guilty plea
without first making the determination. Nevertheless, factual basis deter-
minations have taken place at hearings in aggravation and mitigation
held prior to acceptance of the plea.91 The Fourth District in People v.
Abel,92 however, noted that, "It is much to be preferred that the factual
basis for the plea of guilty be ascertained prior to and separate from the
hearing in aggravation and mitigation."9 3
Furthermore, the factual basis determination may be made any time
prior to a final judgment on the plea as distinguished from prior to ac-
ceptance of the plea. In People v. Price,94 the court stated:
Mhe suggestion that the trial court must first determine the factual basis
prior to acceptance of a guilty plea under Rule 402(c) is not correct.
The factual basis must be determined prior to final judgment. 95
In making this statement, reliance was placed on the express terms of
Rule 402(c), and no opinion has construed the words of Rule 402(c)
to require that the factual basis determination be made prior to accept-
ance of the plea.
Exactly what constitutes a sufficient factual basis to support a guilty
plea is not easily definable. Basically, the trial court must determine to
its satisfaction that a factual basis exists. Reversals on the ground that
a sufficient factual basis does not exist are quite rare, especially in view
of the rule that it is not necessary for the state to produce evidence show-
ing the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, as would be re-
quired at a trial.9
Rule 402(d)-Plea Agreements
Subparagraph (d)(2) provides that the trial court which is prohibited,
under subparagraph (d)(1), from initiating plea discussions, may, at its
discretion, be advised of any tentative plea agreement in advance of the
91. People v. Abel, 10 Ill. App. 3d 210, 291 N.E.2d 841 (4th Dist. 1973); Peo-
ple v. Warship, 6 111. App. 3d 461, 285 N.E.2d 224 (2d Dist. 1972).
92. 10 Ill. App. 3d 210, 291 N.E.2d 841 (4th Dist. 1973).
93. Id. at 213-14, 291 N.E.2d at 844.
94. 9 Ill. App. 3d 693, 292 N.E.2d 752 (3d Dist. 1973). See also People v.
Brooks, 55 Ill. 2d 495, 304 N.E.2d 283 (1973), where a conviction based upon a
guilty plea was upheld and where the factual basis determination took place after
acceptance of the plea but before final judgement. The timing of the factual basis
determination was not, however, put in issue in the case.
95. 9 Ill. App. 3d 693, 694, 292 N.E.2d 752, 754.
96. See, e.g., People v. Hickman, 9 Ill. App. 3d 39, 291 N.E.2d 523 (3d Dist.
1973).
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plea. In the event it is so advised, the trial court may, with the defend-
ant's consent, receive evidence in aggravation and mitigation, and there-
after may indicate its concurrence which must .be stated for the record in
open court. The court may, alternatively, condition its concurrence upon
a later hearing in aggravation and mitigation. If the judge later withdraws
his concurrence or conditional concurrence, the defendant must be so ad-
vised and given the opportunity to affirm or to withdraw his plea of guilty.
Where the defendant does withdraw his plea under these circumstances,
the judge is required to excuse himself.
Under subparagraph (d)(3), where there is a plea agreement, but
the judge has declined to give or the parties have not sought his concur-
rence or conditional concurrence to the agreement, the judge must in-
form the defendant, in open court, at the time the agreement must be
stated, as required under Rule 402(b), that the court is not bound by
the plea agreement. Further, should the defendant still persist in his
plea, the trial judge must inform the defendant that the ultimate disposi-
tion of the case may be different from that contemplated by the plea
agreement.
There have 'been few opinions interpreting Rule 402(d), and those
of significance will now be discussed. Although subparagraph (d)(1)
precludes the judge from initiating plea negotiations, in People v. Abel,97
the Fourth District affirmed a guilty plea conviction where it may be said
that the court did initiate plea negotiations. The appellate court seemed
to ignore this fact while recognizing the rule:
Prior to the appointment of counsel and based upon the conversation at the
time of the explanation of the foregoing rights the court enquired whether
the defendant 'had in mind offering to enter a plea at the time'. Ulti-
mately this case was concluded upon the entry of a plea of guilty arising
out of negotiations between defense counsel and the State's Attorney. At
this juncture we note that Rule 402(d)(I) contemplates that the trial
judge shall not initiate plea negotiations.9 8
No further discussion of subparagraph (d)(1) followed and the court
determined that the trial judge had substantially compiled with Rule 402.
The court, under subparagraph (d)(2), may be advised of the plea
agreement, but is not under a duty to include the agreement in the record.
The court in People v. Goodman99 held that the burden of making the
agreement of record falls upon the parties.
People v. Chesier'00 is an interesting case regarding the general con-
97. 10 III. App. 3d 210, 291 N.E.2d 841 (4th Dist. 1973).
98. Id. at 212, 291 N.E.2d at 843.
99. 2 Il1. App. 3d 584, 588, 277 N.E.2d 136, 139 (2d Dist. 1971).
100. 3 Ill. App. 3d 523, 278 N.E.2d 93 (3d Dist. 1972).
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duct of plea negotiations. The defendant's plea to a charge of attempted
robbery resulted from plea negotiations to which the trial judge indicated
no concurrence. The State offered to recommend a sentence of from
two to eight years if the defendant would not ask for probation and
would waive a hearing in aggravatation and mitigation. The State indi-
cated, however, that it would request a sentence of from three to ten
years if the defendant requested probation or asked for a hearing in ag-
gravation and mitigation. The defendant did request probation which,
after a hearing, was denied. The prosecution then recommended a three
to seven year sentence, and this sentence was imposed by the court.
On appeal, the court upheld the conviction and the sentence against
the defendant's claims of inducement and improper conduct on the part
of the prosecutor. The court concluded that the record failed to sustain
the defendant's charges, stating:
Mhe defendant entered his plea of guilty with a full understanding of
its consequences and . . . he was aware of the fact that the court was not
bound by a recommendation of the prosecution. 101
The correctness of the court's decision was questioned in a dissenting
opinion filed by Justice Stouder. 10 2
Finally, in People v. Hickman,10 3 the court held that the failure of the
trial court to indicate its concurrence or non-concurrence with a plea ne-
gotiation was not, under the facts, reversible error, reasoning that the
court had substantially complied with Rule 402 (d).
Rule 402(e)-Making a Record
Rule 402(e) provides:
Transcript Required. In cases in which the defendant is charged with a
crime punishable by imprisonment in the penitentiary, the proceedings re-
quired by this rule to be in open court shall be taken verbatim, transcribed,
filed, and made a part of the common-law record.
This paragraph was derived from former Rule 401 and is presently re-
quired by Boykin v. Alabama.10 4
The requirements of Rule 402(e) have been held to apply to proba-
tion revocation proceedings at which the defendant admits to violations
of the conditions to probation. 1 5
101. Id. at 525, 278 N.E.2d at 95.
102. Id. at 526-28, 278 N.E.2d at 95-96.
103. 9 Ill. App. 3d 39, 291 N.E.2d 523 (3d Dist. 1973).
104. 395 U.S. 238 (1969).
105. People v. Watkins, 10 Ill. App. 3d 875, 295 N.E.2d 546 (4th Dist. 1973).
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Rule 402(f)-Subsequent Admissibility
Rule 402(f) provides that a plea discussion which does not result in a
plea of guilty, any unaccepted or withdrawn plea of guilty, or a re-
versed judgment on a guilty plea, are not admissible against the defendant
in any criminal proceeding.' 06
RULE 402 AND ITS INTEGRATION INTO THE LEGAL PROCESS
After only a cursory reading of the foregoing, one cannot help but
feel an uncertainty about the interpretation and application of Rule 402.
In order to verify this feeling, the authors undertook an in depth survey of
all the reported Illinois appellate and supreme court decisions containing
one or more 402 issues.' 07 The authors sent detailed questionnaires to
the appellate court judges,' 08 circuit court judges, 10 9 state appellate de-
fenders," aa and state's attorneys"' in order to ascertain the attitudes of
106. There will be no further discussion of Rule 402(f).
107. The authors' search included a perusal of all the Illinois Supreme Court
reporters ending with 56 Ill. 2d 461 and of all the appellate court reporters ending
with 17 Ill. App. 3d 830. Appendix B, p. 94 infra, is a compilation of the totals
of all the data derived from this search. Appendix C, pp. 95-98 infra, also a deriva-
tive of the case search, compares the number of guilty plea cases to the total number
of criminal cases for the years of 1971, 1972, 1973, and 1974.
108. For the purposes of this Comment, results and remarks obtained from these
questionnaires will be interspersed throughout. The word "sampling" will be used
to denote this source. The authors are reproducing the responses exactly as they
appear on the questionnaires. Little attempt has been made to make grammatical
or stylistic corrections.
Of the 36 questionnaires sent to the appellate court judges, unfortunately, only
5 were returned. Therefore, no percentage computation was felt necessary. That
is not to say that the responses received were not useful. On the contrary, the opin-
ions of those responding appellate judges were quite constructive and will be noted
when appropriate. A copy of the questionnaire sent to the appellate court judges
is on file at the offices of the DePaul Law Review.
109. Since Cook is the only county with a criminal division, the authors sent
5 questionnaires to each chief judge of the remaining twenty judicial circuits, re-
questing that they be dispersed to those full circuit court judges who primarily han-
dle criminal matters. Questionnaires were also sent to each of the 21 Cook
County circuit court criminal judges. The response was quite satisfactory and
sufficient enough for the authors to draw some clear conclusions. Of the 121 ques-
tionnaires sent, 43 were returned. A copy of that questionnaire is on file at the of-
fices of the DePaul Law Review.
110. Upon completion of the statistical analysis of the reported decisions, the
authors found that 83% of the appeals were handled by public defense counsel.
Thus, the questionnaires were sent to all the public defenders at the appellate level
in Illinois. Fortunately, 44% of those sent were returned-16 out of 36. A copy
of that questionnaire is on file at the offices of the DePaul Law Review.
111. To 14 of the various offices of the state's attorneys, the authors sent a total
of 85 questionnaires. Unfortunately, the response was a disappointing 15% or 13
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those charged with the responsibility of implementing the rule.
Before discussing the results and conclusions, however, it would be ap-
propriate at this point to note the purposes and goals to which the prac-
tice of pleading guilty is directed so that one can maintain a proper
frame of reference throughout this analysis.
The specific reasons for Rule 402, as discussed in the beginning of this
comment, 1 1 2 are lesser included, though not necessarily less important,
considerations involved in the practice of pleading guilty. Since this prac-
tice is a relatively late arrival in the history of the administration of crim-
inal justice and as such serves to replace, among other things, the sacred
right to a determination of guilt by a jury of one's peers, the following
factors must be an integral part of the deliberation of every guilty plea
proceeding.
First, the plea must be accurate. Precautions must be taken to make
sure that the defendant is guilty of the offense charged and that he is
voluntarily pleading guilty to that offense. This requirement is essen-
tial to the maintenance of a legitimate system of administration of crim-
inal justice.
Second, the defendant must be treated fairly. If the defendant is treated
fairly, he will not perceive the process as a mechanical, ritualistic experi-
ence but rather one which encourages a willingness to accept the respon-
sibility for, and consequences of his actions. If the process is such that
one will view it as something other than fair and reasonable, that process
will become an immediate and many times irreconcilable impedence
to the goal of rehabilitation, thus providing the defendant with a conveni-
ent rationalization for his harmful behavior.
Third, the process must be as certain as possible. If the process is
predictable, it will inevitably aid in providing fair representation for both
the defendant and the state. The institutionalization of a process that is
congruent with the first two factors will better enable the actors to per-
ceive their roles. Once these roles are perceived and experienced, the
expectations of the participants will become informally recognized and
the process will become more certain. This certainty would also eliminate
time consuming and costly assertions of error which would upset the de-
sired finality of lower court judgments.
out of 85. It should be noted therefore that the total percentage figure in Appendix
D, pp. 98-99 infra, is influenced by the higher return of circuit court questionnaires.
A copy of the state's attorneys' questionnaire is on file at the offices of the DePaul
Law Review.
112. See text accompanying notes 1-8 supra.
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Finally, the guilty plea procedure should be efficient. For the experi-
ence to be a meaningful one, in terms of rehabilitation of the defendant,
a drawn out mini-trial could place too heavy an emphasis on stigmatiza-
tion and retribution which would in most cases be counter-productive.
On the other hand, too short a proceeding would give the defendant the
impression that he or she is being "railroaded" into jail. This form of
"selling out" would diminish the legitimacy of the institution in the de-
fendant's eyes and would rightfully cause the defendant to question the
fairness of his treatment. A carefully balanced procedure would serve the
best interest of both the state and the defendant. 113 Thus, the term ef-
ficient is not limited solely to the consideration of the court calendar
and speed of disposition. To circumscribe the appellation efficient so
narrowly would be a functional misdefinition and would do little in the
way of correcting behavior. Those who equate the term efficient solely
with the notion of clearing the courts' calendars should take notice of
the fact that to expedite guilty plea proceedings at the expense of pro-
viding a fair and reasonable hearing is itself inefficient. 114
Illinois Supreme Court Rule 402 is unquestionably the most laudable
effort to make guilty plea proceedings fair, certain, accurate and effec-
tive. Initially, this can be gleaned from the specificity in the terms of
the rule itself. However, due to the unique nature of the subject matter
with which the rule deals (persons admitting guilt) and other institutional
factors, the application of the specific and apparently clear terms has been
anything but uniform. This lack of uniformity has resulted in a proce-
dure that is not always accurate, certain or fair. It has also been the
catalyst for greater confusion and thus more appeals. The purpose of
this section is to describe that which brought the authors to state these as-
sertions. It should be noted, however, that the preceding conclusions are
based upon analysis of the reported decisions and questionnaires. The
fact that many cases are not appealed and that many result in Anders
briefs" 5 attests to the notion that many judges and attorneys are mindful
113. The most experienced counsel will attest to the fact that selecting the num-
ber of witnesses to testify is a crucial task, as too many will diminish the effect
of the key witness' testimony. This avoidance of attrition must also be attained
in guilty plea proceedings if they are to have a positive rehabilitative effect on the
defendant who is pleading guilty.
114. This correlation can be inferred from the high rate of recidivism experi-
enced nationwide. Although not the sole origin of this phenomenon, the guilty plea
hearing is an integral part of the process that is supposed to "correct" people's be-
havior.
115. Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967) (requiring public defense coun-
sel to write a brief describing the possible issues on appeal and stating why the ap-
peal was insubstantial). Of the 212 cases surveyed, 25 of the 189 affirmed cases
[Vol. 24:42
GUILTY PLEAS IN ILLINOIS
of the significance of this guilty plea procedure. The focus here is on the
proper institutionalization of the values of such a procedure, something
that the authors feel has not occurred nor appears to be imminent.
On September 1, 1970 Illinois Supreme Court Rule 402 relating to guilty
pleas became effective. From that day hence, the trial judge became re-
quired to administer specifically pronounced admonitions while ascer-
taining certain other information for the record. As is true with legisla-
tive enactments, many of the terms of the rule called for interpretation
and definition. Judicial construction combined with the fact that Rule
402 was more elaborate than its predecessor, made more appellate litiga-
tion inevitable. In 1971, only 9 of the 73 guilty plea appeals in the appel-
late courts pertained to Rule 402-this time lag is indicative of the bur-
densome appellate case load. By 1972, however, the total number of 402
cases in the appellate courts had already exceeded its predecessor's
1971 appeals by 7.116 Thus, the 1972 appeals were almost 7 times the
number reported in 1971. In 1973 the number of 402 appeals increased
44% over 1972.117 Given the greater specificity of the terms of the rule,
these facts do not appear significant. However, a discussion with the
Administrator of -the Office of the State Appellate Defender revealed that
255 of their cases pending as of May 1, 1974, contained one or more 402
issues."18 All other things being equal, if decisions were rendered by De-
cember, 1974, in three-fourths of those cases pending, an increase of
116% over 1973 could result."19 Regardless of this speculation, the
number of appeals still pending represents a significant increase over the
previous year's figures. 120 What becomes immediately apparent after four
were the result of an Anders brief. Not one was reversed. It should be noted,
however, that of the public defenders who responded to the questionnaire, 56% felt
that the Anders brief puts the public defender in an unsatisfactory position.
116. For this discussion, Illinois Supreme Court statistics will be excluded since
only two decisions have been rendered by this court regarding Rule 402.
117. See Appendix C, pp. 95-96 infra. In 1971, 1% of the total appellate court
criminal cases were 402 cases. In 1972, 8% of the total appellate court criminal
cases were 402 cases. In 1973, 11% of the total appellate court criminal cases were
402 cases. By March 1974, 402 cases represented 16% of the total number of re-
ported Illinois criminal cases.
118. The breakdown was as follows: First District-17, Second District-60,
Third District-41, Fourth District-63, and Fifth District-74.
119. This increase does not take into account the fact that approximately 17%
of the appeals are represented by private defense counsel. For the compilation of this
data, motor vehicle and municipal ordinance violations were excluded.
120. Of the 212 cases reported and used in the survey for this Comment, 54 were
abstract opinions. See ILL. SuP. Cr. R. 23. Given the prediction that the number
of decisions will increase, there is good reason to believe that appellate courts will
rely more heavily on the use of memorandum opinions, the precedential value of
which is less meaningful for appellate counsel.
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years of experience with the rule and 212 reported decisions is that the
number of appeals has not stabilized and a leveling off does not appear
imminent.
The uncertain state of the rule to date is also depicted by the high
rate at which cases involving guilty plea appeals are reversed. Of the
total number of guilty plea appeals,' 21 28% resulted in reversals. Since
many of the appeals involved one or more 402 issues, the authors further
dissected the decisions and found that of the different 402 issues discussed,
31% were considered adequate grounds for reversal.' 22  Thus, -there are
many more unresolved problems than the raw case reversal rate indicates.
Since more than one of every four appeals result in a reversal and a re-
mandment, it takes little insight to realize that the effect of the adoption
of Rule 402 was to place an additional strain on the administration of
criminal justice in Illinois. In order to get a proper perspective of the
causes of this dilemma and to determine whether such a result was un-
avoidable, other aspects of this area must be examined.
As the objective analysis of this paper points out, there is substantial
disagreement among the various appellate courts as to the interpretation
of the different subsections of Rule 402.123 For example, some courts
require that the essential elements of the charge be recited to properly
admonish the defendant, while others find that merely stating the
name of the charge is sufficient. Some courts have even hedged on the
express language of the rule and allowed the state's attorney, instead of
the trial judge, to admonish the defendant. 124
When studying 402 court opinions, one is constantly confronted with the
term "substantial compliance." It is inevitable, as the rule specifies that
its requirements must be satisfied by "substantial compliance." In effect,
"substantial compliance" is a medium through which the attitudes of the
appellate court judges toward Rule 402 are translated. The manipulation
of each court's concept of the guilty plea process is thus achieved
through the use of this discretionary denomination. Some courts have
121. Since five opinions were reversed on other grounds, the total number of
cases used for this computation was 207.
122. See Appendix B, p. 94 infra for the relevant data. It should be noted that
appellate and supreme court opinions do not always discuss each and every issue
that is raised.
123. The different appellate courts have so far explicitly noted this fact on var-
ious occasions. People v. Garcia, 8 Ill. App. 3d 542, 543, 289 N.E.2d 637, 638
(3d Dist. 1972), quoted in People v. Ellis, 16 Ill. App. 3d 282, 306 N.E.2d 53 (2d
Dist. 1974).
124. Thus the application of the fiction of "incorporation by reference." People
v. Larrabee, 7 Ill. App. 3d 726, 729, 288 N.E.2d 538, 540 (5th Dist. 1972).
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strictly interpreted the rule-most notably the Fifth District-while others
have broadly circumscribed the scope of the rule and have viewed the en-
tire record to ascertain, in essence, whether substantial justice has been
achieved.
It would be far too myopic, however, to say that the problem lies
solely with the phrase "substantial compliance." That, like similar
phrases, is a device which allows the judge to accomodate the law to the
particular defendant. To bring to light the causes of this dilemma, one
must travel beyond the words of the rule and into the court room. It is
from the interaction of the participants that one can divine the human
aspect of that which surfaces at the appellate level as but a symptom
couched in legalese.
One of the most significant ramifications of the rule is the altering of
the trial judge's role which, in turn, implies that the proceeding be con-
ducted in an almost non-adversarial milieu.125  That the full burden has
been placed on the trial judge's shoulders is attested to by Judge John
R. Wright of the Seventh Judicial Circuit, who states that
The rule is bad in that it makes the judge be an advocate. Because the
State's Attorney sits back and lets the judge do it all; the judge must solicit
the facts to prove the case. Then the judge passes judgment on whether
he has proven his case, i.e. is the plea voluntary, etc. Hence when the
case goes to the appellate court it is really a trial by the appellate court
on the record to see if the trial judge properly proved up his case. 126
Thus, there are those who feel that this switch in roles is neither war-
ranted 127 nor beneficial. Although the following statement of a circuit
125. The change in the rule from "the court finds from the proceeding had in
open court" (ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110A, § 401(b) (1969)) to "[t]he court shall
not accept a plea of guilty without first, by addressing the defendant personally in
open court, informing him of and determining that," envisions a more affirmative
role for the judge in guilty plea proceedings. (Emphasis added).
In response to a question about his expectations of the effect of the rule at the
trial level when adopted, Judge John L. Moore of the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit
stated, "Trouble!"
126. This quotation, as those that will follow, was taken from the questionnaires.
No quotation has been made without the express authority of the respondent. It
should be noted at this point that the authors requested that the respondents answer
the questions not with regard to what they believed to be the status of the law, but
rather what they felt the law surrounding Rule 402 should be.
127. Judge Albert G. Webber III of the Sixth Judicial Circuit, in reply to
whether he was satisfied with a nonadversarial hearing, stated:
No. The parties know much more about the case and the defendant and
his record. More emphasis is needed and more reliance should be placed
on representations of counsel.
In a more lengthy statement, Judge John R. Wright of the Seventh Judicial Cir-
cuit, commented:
The proof should be made adversarily by the State's Attorney and defense
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court judge begins to discuss the rule approvingly, the statement alludes
to his discontent with the burden he must now shoulder:
I have felt that Rule 402 is a good rule, but would require that where
counsel for defendant appears to be able, he should be required to make
a statement for the record that he, as counsel, has fully and accurately
advised the accused as to every right he may have in connection with the
charge and that he, counsel for defendant, has also fully advised the ac-
cused as to each and every element of Rule 402.
When faced with a 402 appeal, the appellate court judge is also con-
fronted with coping with this role change. The degree to which the ap-
pellate court judge believes that this change is proper will directly af-
fect his definition of "substantial compliance." Needless to say, the rule
has created a good deal of apprehension at the trial level and tension
between the lower and appellate courts. One circuit court judge goes so
far as to say that
The rule that judges should not practice law or give legal advice should
apply to criminal defendants. Also the practice required by Rule 402
makes it appear that the judge is trying to help the defendant escape a
penalty by avoiding a necessary step toward the rehabilitation, i.e. the ac-
knowledgement of guilt. The practice is repugnant.
Another area that brings into focus the problem of the trial judge's con-
cept of his role is plea negotiations. Until the adoption of Rule 402(d),
guilty procedures in Illinois lived a veiled existence as the illegitimate
child of the trial package. Although 402(d) has not been particularly
troublesome either in its interpretation or application, and the number
of appeals arising from it are few, the sampling has indicated a sharp di-
vergence of opinion. The requirements of Rule 402(d), to the extent
that they control plea negotiations are indeed novel. More important,
however, is the fact that subsection (d) provides a more realistic approach
to plea discussion and negotiations. Under Rule 402(d), any tenta-
tive plea agreement may be brought to the attention of the trial judge, at
the judge's discretion, upon a request by the parties. It is then up to
the judge to indicate, in open court, his concurrence or conditional concur-
rence with the proposed disposition of the case. The judge must, how-
attorney so that the trial judge could pass on the record. Then if the
State's Attorney can't make the defendant understand something the Judge
is free to observe and criticize and make the State's Attorney go further
than personally trying to figure out how to put it so the defendant will
understand. If the Judge fails to make himself understood, he must then
rule against himself. Will he or will he not approve of his own work?
The rule should be abolished or revised to eliminate these defects. A plea
of guilty is a conviction and the State's Attorney should have to get it.
The State's Attorney doesn't care now because if the plea is reversed it
is the Judge who is reversed and the State's Attorney can remain smug be-
cause the Judge blundered in proving his case.
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ever, inform the defendant that the trial court is not bound by the plea
agreement where the judge's concurrence has not been indicated. Above
all, the trial judge must refrain from initiating plea discussions, as. to do
so would violate Rule 402(d)(1).
Based upon the responses to the questionnaires, it may be said that
participation in plea negotiations by the trial judge is generally favored.128
Responses to the question of whether it is proper for the trial judge, upon
request and with the defendant's permission, to participate in plea discus-
sions centered mainly on two alternative views. Most judges questioned
favored praticipation-on the theory that it helps in clarifying the under-
standing of the parties as well as expediting disposition of the cases.
Judge Glenn T. Johnson, appellate court judge for the First Judicial
District, Fourth Division, stated that the judge's participation in plea
discussions "is essential in order that both sides may have a cleai under-
standing as to the fruits of the conference." One circuit court judge
stated that such participation on a case-by-case level is a "practical neces.
sity."
On the other hand, many judges opposed participation in plea negoti-
ations, some flatly stating that they never get involved in plea discus-
sions of any kind. The general feeling of these judges was that by par-
ticipating in plea negotiations, the trial judge cannot remain an unbiased
participant, and is, therefore, unable to make an objective evaluation of
the resulting plea agreement.
Judge Thomas J. Moran, appellate judge in the Second District, summed
up the position of a number of the minority of judges who disfavor
participation by the judge when he stated, "the trial judge should not be
a party to a 'contract' upon which he must later sit in judgment."
One circuit court judge, in supporting his view that the trial judge
should not participate, emphasized the effect the trial judge might have
on the defendant. This Second Circuit judge stated that by participating
in plea discussions "the court tends to become an adversary. [A] dom-
inant judge working with [the] prosecutor can intimidate the defendant."
Finally, Judge Albert G. Webber III of the Sixth Judicial Circuit went
so far as to say that the judge's participation makes the proceedings
"too close to the star chamber."
Public defenders tended to favor participation mainly on the theory
that it increases the predictability of the post-plea outcome of the case.129
128. Overall 64% of the judges, state's attorneys, and public defendants favored
the judge's participation in plea negotiations.
129. 60% of the public defenders favored the judge's participation.
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Thus, while most of the judges, state's attorneys and public defend-
ers who responded to the questionnaires favored the trial judge's partici-
pation, the pro and con opinions were widely divergent. Opinions were,
in general, either strongly for or strongly against the judge's participation.
The significance of this result may not be attributed simply to personal
opinions on the matter of the trial court's participation. Conceivably, a
uniform understanding of the trial judge's function at plea discussions is
lacking. The feeling of many judges that participation in the plea
negotiations 'may lead to prejudice could result from these judges per-
ceiving their role at this point in the guilty plea proceedings differently
than those judges who did not feel they would be prejudiced by such
participation.
What has become apparent is that the rule has brought to the surface
problems that are inherent in the development of an adequate guilty
plea process. These conflicts were inevitable and necessary to resolve
some of the practices inconsistent with the policies underlying guilty
pleas. Judge Allan L. Stouder of the Third District Court of Appeals has
commented:
Many of the problems have arisen because some trial court judges do not
like the rule and consequently the rule has been ignored or the compliance
has been grudging and [inleffectual. I think trial judges might well prefer
that most of the areas covered by 402 should be left to be resolved be-
tween the defendant and his attorney. Because the Bench and Bar have
been somewhat negligent in the representation of those accused of crime
particularly if compensation thereof was limited or non-existent, we have
now by evolutionary means institutionalized our awareness of these de-
ficiencies.
While these and other factors have led to considerable resistance to
the new rule,130 some feel that bringing guilty pleas out into the open,
with the trial judge in control of the proceeding, is the best way "to estab-
lish that the defendant understands the consequences of his acts."1131
Those who accept the basic premises upon which the rule was founded
exude frustration over the course it has taken. The general tenor of
many of the public defenders' responses seems to disparage the trial
130. When asked if they would prefer a guilty plea process whereby the manner
in which the trial court satisfies Rule 402 is specifically predetermined (a procedure
similar to patterned jury instructions), 79% of the circuit court judges responded
in the affirmative. When asked for a solution to the increase of appeals, somejudges felt that the "Supreme Court should make a new rule," rather than work
with the present rule.
131. Judge Paul C. Verticchio of the Seventh Judicial Circuit made this response
after acknowledging that he was satisfied that the rule contemplated an essentially
non-adversarial hearing.
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judges for failing to enforce the explicit terms of the rule' 32 and the ap-
pellate court judges for diluting the rule's effectiveness through the ve-
hicle of "substantial compliance."' 133
In an interesting variation on this non-adversarial theme, some of the
public defenders believe that the state's attorneys should be as careful a
guardian of the trial record as defense counsel. A public defender com-
mented:
In view of the fact that many trial judges do not fully comply with Rule
402, the state's attorney should view his function as assuring that no omis-
sions are made by the trial judge. In particular the state's attorney should
make sure that any plea agreement is fully and clearly stated on the record
and ... that a factual basis for the plea is fully established on the rec-
ord.
Kent Osborne, assistant appellate defender for the Third District, cogently
sums up what must be considered a prevalent attitude of the defense
side:
I don't think I do my clients much good by reversing their guilty pleas,
but appellate defenders have at least stimulated proper compliance with
402 at the trial level. After a while any trial judge is going to get tired
of having his guilty plea reversed and remanded.
The discontent is not limited, however, to defense counsel. One
state's attorney, with thirteen years of experience, bristled when he stated
that the best approach to reduce the number of appeals would be to
supply the trial judge with pattern admonitions "and suspend the judge
for six months, without pay, if he fluffs his job." Thus, the acceptance
of this new role formation by the adversaries is not a function of one's
clientele.
There is also apparent support for the rule from many circuit court
judges. Although one could argue that those circuit court judges who
responded to the questionnaires were the most disheartened by the rule,
82% felt that the rule, as it now exists, is fair and effective. Since 65%
132. One public defender, when responding negatively to the question of whether
a uniform application of a well defined and specific guilty plea procedure would sig-
nificantly reduce the number of appeals, stated that "402 is not difficult. The prob-
lem is with judges whose only concern has been moving cases along quickly."
Later that same public defender, in response to a similar question, noted:
The problem has been that trial judges don't want to take the time. Either
they are concerned about the docket, or they are unconcerned about people
who confess to being criminals. 402 is pretty straightforward.
133. In response to the question, "What would be the best approach to decrease
the number of appeals," one public defender stated, "enforcement of the existing
rule by the appellate courts."
A more detailed discussion of this attitude and its causes can be found in the
text beginning with note 135 infra.
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of that same sampling felt that a uniform application of a well defined and
specific guilty plea procedure would significantly decrease the number
of appeals, one must conclude that a great number of circuit court
judges take issue with the lack of certainty in application rather than the
rule itself. This conclusion is buttressed by the fact that of the ques-
tionnaires' alternatives dealing with structural changes of the rule, only
26% favored restructuring the rule, only 13% favored amendments that
would more precisely define its terms, and only 9% favored amend-
ments that would include new or expanded requirements. The over-
whelming choice, preferred by 83%, was supplying the trial judge with
patterned admonitions. This last alternative would do nothing to the rule
itself, but would directly affect its application. 13 4
Further evidence of positive feelings toward the rule is supplied by
other responses in the sampling. Although clearly supported by appel-
late case law, 80% of the circuit court judges sampled indicated that a
written statement submitted by the defendant waiving certain rights was
an unsatisfactory substitute for the judge ascertaining t'he waiver by per-
sonally questioning the defendant. This preference showed that those
sampled concurred with the concept of the judge as a more active partici-
pant. This attitude is also illustrated by Judge John W. Rapp, Jr. of the
Fifteenth Judicial Circuit who, when responding to the question of
whether he felt that a uniform application of a well defined and specific
guilty plea procedure would decrease the number of appeals, stated that
"we already have one as far as I am concerned-Rule 402."
Regardless of this role conflict and the fact that there are those at the
trial level who do support the present rule, there is yet another obstacle to
overcome. The appellate courts are not interpreting Rule 402 so that
it can be applied with a sufficient degree of certainty. 185 If one is to as-
sume that the rule does envision the aforementioned role change, the ap-
pellate court should realize this fact and act to alleviate as much of the
strain as possible. Instead, in the words of the Third District Court of
Appeals, "the decisions interpreting and applying Rule 402 are not com-
pletely harmonious and the rule itself as a developing principle has not
yet achieved its intended purpose."'81 6
134. See Appendix D, pp. 96-99 infra, for a breakdown of the questionnaire re-
sponses.
135. When later discussing an approach to resolving the problem of application,
the authors will give attention to the conflicts ensuing from the specific subsections
of the rule.
136. People v. Garcia, 8 Ill. App. 3d 542, 543, 289 N.E.2d 637, 638 (3d Dist.
1972). In Garcia, the court affirmed the conviction but conditioned it upon the
virtually impossible task of determining whether the plea was voluntary. Since none
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This inconsistency is experienced at every level of interaction. In-
stead of aiding the trial judges through a difficult period of readjust-
ment, the appellate courts have added to their anxieties.' 3 7 As one
state's attorney notes:
As it stands now, with no uniformity, the appellate courts must substitute
their judgment for that of the trial court in each case. By a uniform pro-
cedure I believe this problem would be alleviated.
When asked the best way to decrease the number of appeals, three of the
five responding appellate court judges felt that the trial judge should be
supplied with patterned admonitions. One appellate court judge felt
that the trial judge should be supplied with patterned admonitions, that
the rule should be restructured and that the rule should be amended by
adding more precise definitions. The fifth responding appellate court judge,
Thomas J. Moran of the Second District felt that:
Because of the many seemingly inconsistent appellate court opinions on
what constitutes a proper admonition under the Rule, it would be helpful
if the Supreme Court would review the Rule (either under Rule 302(b)
or by petition for leave to appeal) and establish what it means by "sub-
stantial compliance."
When asked if a uniform application of a well defined and specific
guilty plea procedure would significantly decrease the number of ap-
peals in this area, 65% of the circuit judges responded in the affirma-
tive as well as 85% of the state's attorneys and 75 % of the public de-
fenders: a total of 71 %. When asked if they would prefer a guilty plea
process whereby the manner in which the trial court satisfies Rule 402 is
specifically predetermined (e.g., what must be given to satisfy the re-
of this could have been part of the common law record, such a remand is tanta-
mount to sanctioning a hearing, the testimony of which, would be based upon hear-
say allegations and testimony of witnesses with faded memories.
The proper remedy should be a reversal with the direction to allow the defendant
to plead anew if he or she so desires. The defendant should be allowed the oppor-
tunity to plead anew for it "not only will insure that every accused is afforded those
procedural safeguards, but also [it] will help reduce the great waste of judicial re-
sources required to process the frivolous attacks on guilty plea convictions that are
encouraged, and are more difficult to dispose of, when the original record is inade-
quate." McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459 (1969), cited with approval in
People v. Krantz, 12 Ill. App. 3d 38, 40-41, 297 N.E.2d 386, 388 (4th Dist. 1973).
137. There is even a degree of disdain leveled at the appellate courts from the
lower courts. In response to whether one's expectations as to the effect of Rule
402 when adopted were realized, one circuit court judge stated, "In most part. Re-
viewing Court tends to abuse this power by picking out or adding technicalities not
provided by Rule 402."
Later that same judge, in response to whether a uniform application of a well
defined specific guilty plea procedure would significantly reduce the appeals, stated,




quirement that the defendant be admonished regarding the nature of the
charge; similar to patterned instructions), 79% of the circuit court judges
responded in the affirmative as well as 92% of the state's attorneys
and 43% of the public defenders' 38 : a total of 73%. When asked if
they felt that appellate court decisions have defined and interpreted the
rule in such a way as to make it predictable, the circuit court judges split
evenly, while 64% of the state's attorneys and 64% of the public de-
fenders responded in the negative. In light of the preceding responses, the
circuit court judges' last reaction might appear somewhat incongruous.
The authors are led to believe, however, that this discrepancy may be
explained by the fact, that each individual district's position appears
relatively certain, though inconsistent when compared with the posture
of the other districts. Nonetheless, the overwhelming response in fa-
vor of supplying 'the trial judge with patterned admonitions (83% of the
circuit court judges, 100% of the state's attorneys and 67% of the public
defenders) 139 evidences a lack of uniformity and attests to the need for
more certain procedures. 1 40
Given the present circumstances, the institutional pressure of reversal
on circuit court judges has become an increasing source of anguish.
Judge Donald W. Morthland of the Sixth Judicial Circuit stated:
It seems to me that many of the reversals under 402 imply incompetent
representation by the Bar. I can't believe that this is the case and the
implication is unfortunate. 141
1,38. The reason for this response appears to stem from the apprehension that
the admonishments by the trial judge will become too mechanistic if they are pat-
terned. One public defender perceptively noted that:
Patterned instructions may well solve an adminhistrative problem but they
won't solve the due process problem. Coping with the latter however-
by making judges take an interest in the defendant's perception of under-
standing of what is happening-will solve both problems.
139. See Appendix D, pp. 96-99 infra.
140. The fact that appellate courts have gone beyond the terms of the rule and
have looked to the whole record can be considered one source of frustration for
those who feel that a strict interpretation of the rule is necessary to attain the pre-
viously mentioned goals of a meaningful guilty plea procedure. In response to
whether he was satisfied that the rule contemplated control of the proceedings by
the trial judge in an essentially non-adversarial hearing, one public defender stated:
No. Because the case law has allowed one to look elsewhere in the record
-such as in probation reports and the prosecutor's comments--to fill in
the gaps in the judges' admonitions.
In defense of this position, one circuit court judge commented that:
All prior proceedings (e.g. motion to suppress) before the same judge
should become part of the proceedings and usable in determining factual
basis, voluntariness, etc.
141. The feeling that Judge Morthland expresses is consonant with the authors'
view that this area is not simple, but, rather, a matrix of complex relations.
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For those not satisfied with 402's new role structure, appellate court in-
terpretation has been perceived as a coercive agent. One Seventh Cir-
cuit judge noted that
From the wording of the Rule the judge's participation could be minimal.
It doesn't work out this way for many judges because of our interest of
not looking too stupid in the appellate court.
This judge's experiences led him to believe that the rule was not effective
and fair as it was "not fair to the prosecution since there are too many
chances for error."
Unfortunately, one consequence of this perplexity has been an under-
current directed toward eliminating the defendant's right to appeal upon
the conclusion of a proper guilty plea hearing. 142  Such a solution begs
the problem. Appeals, especially in this area, have served to clarify the
difficulties. Even if the supreme court were inclined to make a change
in the rule, that court would need the guidance that appellate court
decisions would provide. The reticularity of this situation could not
have been discovered had the right to appeal been dissolved.
One interesting modification of this view was expressed by Judge Paul
142. Judge Albert G. Webber III, of the Sixth Judicial Circuit, has suggested
that:
The rule should provide that "substantial compliance" waives all errors ex-
cept jurisdiction and that the plea is immune to collateral attack by post-
conviction petition, habeas corpus, etc.
It has been held, in an abstract opinion stemming from a post-conviction petition,
that:
Record establishing defendant's entry of guilty plea thereby manifested
waiver of all non-jurisdictional errors, including subsequent post-conviction
allegation of incompetancy of counsel with whom defendant expressed no
displeasure at time of plea.
People v. Rogers, 15 Il1. App. 3d 925, 305 N.E.2d 193 (1st Dist. 1973) (Emphasis
added).
Since this was an abstract opinion, the precedent for such a decision was omitted.
In Rogers, the defendant contended that counsel was incompetent, and thus the plea
involuntary, as no witnesses were called on the defendant's behalf. The italicized
portion of the statement is a misleading general statement. As prior case law points
out, this statement refers only to infringement of constitutional rights afforded the
defendant, usually arising from pre-guilty plea proceedings (hearing on motions to
suppress, etc.). These cases have arisen on appeal when the defendant loses a mo-
tion to suppress, enters a plea of guilty and then later tries to attack the voluntari-
ness of the plea on direct appeal, instead of going to trial and then taking a direct
appeal. See, e.g., People v. Wilson, 29 Ill. 2d 82, 193 N.E.2d 449 (1963); People
v. Deweese, 27 11. 2d 332, 189 N.E.2d 247 (1963).
It would be an error, however, to believe that a guilty plea waives the right of
the defendant to file a direct appeal based on some violation of Rule 402. Though
not raised as yet, 402(a), (b), and (c) all go to the defendant's knowledge, under-
standing, and voluntariness-requirements of constitutional magnitude since Boykin
v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969). It is curious that this was not the grounds upon
which People v. Rogers rested.
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C. Verticchio of the Seventh Judicial Circuit who stated that:
It is this court's opinion that 402 protects the rights of the defendant...
however, there should be a provision that upon 402 being fully complied
with and all rights of the defendant protected that the defendant waive
any right to appeal. Unless this provision is made part of 402 in the fu-
ture the unlimited number of appeals from guilty pleas will continue to
burden the appellate court. (emphasis added)
This variation of full compliance and complete protection adds another
dimension to the right to appeal issue, for it points out a path that must
eventually be crossed: when a fair and effective guilty plea procedure
has been institutionalized, what will be the most accurate and efficient
means of verification? Although a lesser consideration, the method
devised to police these procedures should be an integral component of a
process that is fair, effective, efficient and which provides a sufficient
amount of certainty for the participant in terms of the finality of the
judgment.
The evidence put forth in this section leads the authors to conclude
that the appellate courts have made the trial judges' new role even more
uncertain. Bound by the fact that in most cases the defendant is
guilty, the appellate courts find it difficult, if not absurd, to reverse be-
cause of what is considered to be a technical non-compliance. Often-
times, the courts recognize the fact that affirming the particular fact pat-
tern before them means that the spirit of the rule is being betrayed-
"while we do not approve any relaxation of Supreme Court Rule 402,
where the error under the circumstances of a particular case is not of
sufficient magnitude, there should be no reversal. ' ' 143 In effect, there
is a gap between the rule and court room practice, and appellate court
interpretation is providing a precedent to perpetuate this hiatus. Be-
cause of these circumstances, the authors are led to believe that the so-
lution cannot be found in the appellate courts.
RESOLVING THE PROBLEM OF APPLICATION
Appellate court litigation has been quite valuable in circumscribing this
enigma. However, given, among other things, the unusually high in-
crease in the number of appeals and the high rate of reversals, no unity
of approach has been formulated from the judicial process. When one
is concerned with implementing an effective and fair guilty plea proce-
dure, these factors cause dismay. There should be no reason for ap-
143. People v. Ellis, 16 Il. App. 3d 282, 285, 306 N.E.2d 53, 55 (2d Dist.
1974) (affirmed); People v. Scott, 9 Ill. App. 3d 626, 627, 292 N.E.2d 583
(3d Dist. 1973) (affirmed and ren.anded to Oetrmini vol~ntoriness),
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pealing a guilty plea on grounds of technical non-compliance.1 44  Need-
less to say, these appeals are inefficient as well as costly.
To resolve this problem, attention must be focused on the trial level,
and consideration must be given to the purpose of the proceeding and to
the two main participants: the defendant and the judge. However, before
the trial judge can be effective, regard must be given to the dynamics
of this transaction. The judge, a significant actor in the administration
of criminal justice, is faced with making some very crucial determinations
regarding the degree of culpability and potential for rehabilitation of
the defendant. In most cases the defendant's behavior is non-conforming
and violent. In order to make the essential decisions with which the
judge is charged, the judge must understand the many facets of socio-
pathic behavior and violence in this society. Then he must begin to for-
mulate and implement, respectively, his own unique theory and method
of interpersonal dispute resolution. Unless approached in this coherent
fashion, the problem of dealing with one who commits an offense against
society can never be challenged in any meaningful way. 145
In structuring a hearing that will not only be accurate and certain, but
144. Of the 212 guilty plea appeals, 45 opinions were void of reliance on any
specific subsection of the rule. Thus, many reported decisions were of no preceden-
tial value and were considered to be of little value generally. It should be noted
that there were two decisions in which the court noted that the state failed to sub-
mit a brief. In both cases, the judgments were affirmed.
In response to whether they thought that guilty plea appeals took up more time
than they should, given their responsibility to effectively represent the remainder of
their caseload, 82% of the state's attorneys responded in the affirmative while only
29% of the public defenders so responded. One could read the public defenders'
response as originating from their institutional biases and as a result of the feeling
that the question implied that the defendants were not worthy of the appeal process.
In light of their ever-increasing caseload and the feeling, as expressed by one pub-
lic defender, that:
I have felt for some time that the trial judge should be provided with
something like patterned instructions, because it seems so senseless to have
to reverse guilty pleas when the result is that the defendant pleads guilty
all over again. . . I don't think I do my clients much good by reversing
their guilty pleas, but appellate defenders have at least stimulated proper
compliance with 402 at the trial level[,]
the general response of the public defenders appears somewhat suspect.
145. There have been many interesting and relevant studies that would be of con-
siderable help. See, e.g., E. LiEBow, TALY'S CORNER: A STUDY OF NEGRO
STREETCORNER MEN (1967). There has also been a concerted attempt from other
disciplines to alert those in the legal profession to various discoveries about human
behavior so that a coherent approach from the legal community can be implemented.
Cf. J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD & A. SOLNIT, BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE
CHILD (1973) (A book written by psychiatrists, it focuses on the "development of
guidelines to decisionmaking in law concerned with the selection and manipulation
of a child's external environment as a means of improving and nourishing his inter-
nal environment." Id. at 7).
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also a first step toward the rehabilitation of the defendant, the authors
believe that a certain symmetry of order and humanity must be present.
The adjudication of guilt without regard for the treatment of the person
and his attitudes toward himself and others is the first step away from
rehabilitation. Although there are a number of those whose potential
for rehabilitation is negligible, there are a vast number who can be
reached. Coupled with the fact that when a stranger is placed in a
small group situation where all but that stranger are experienced mem-
bers of that group, the chances of having some influence on the individ-
ual are exceedingly good. 14 6 It is all, however, a function of that group's
ability to understand the defendant's situation and then guide him to-
ward an awareness of a more personally meaningful perspective. 147
The authors' model of interaction envisions participation by all the ac-
tors in the proceeding. The trial judge's role, however, is crucial. He
must transform advocates to counselors and touch the defendant in such
a way as to make him a willing receptor. The trial judge must be able
to comprehend the facts of the case as presented by the counselors and
the defendant and then collimate these views into a coherent and mean-
ingful thought-form for the defendant. Combined with the judge's
higher position of authority and the respectful and fairly devised proceed-
ing, much can be assimilated by a defendant who is treated as an individ-
ual of worth.' 48
146. The impact of the aura of the courtroom is verified in Hetzler & Kanter,
INFORMALITY AND THE COURT: A STUDY OF THE BEHAVIOR OF COURT OFFICIALS in
THE PROCESSING OF DEFENDANTS, POLmCS AND CRIME 76 (S. Sylvester, Jr. & E.
Sagarin, eds. 1974) (The nonverbal and informal aspects of courtroom behavior are
scrutinized and the authors conclude that "the determination of guilt or innocence
actually takes place in an atmosphere of implied guilt .. .directly influencing the
formal determination of guilt. Id. at 82).
147. The law does not exist in a void. For the law to be effective, the scope
of adjudication must be expanded to envelope the entire problem. What the authors
are implying is that the techniques of group therapy and interaction should become
an integral part of the defendant's "courtroom" experience. There is a wealth of
literature on group interaction and behavior that can help begin this inquiry. See,
e.g., G. EGAN, FACE TO FACE: THE SMALL-GROuP EXPERIENCE AND INTERPERSONAL
GROWTH (1973); D. WATSON & R. THARP, SELF-DIRECTED BEHAVIOR: SELF-MODIFI-
CATION FOR PERSONAL ADJUSTMENT (1972).
148. Not until recently have legal scholars begun to pursue the path upon which
social scientists ventured years earlier. In his article, critical of Packer's "Battle
Model" of criminal procedure, John Griffiths explores an alternative view: the Fam-
ily Model. Griffiths, Ideology in Criminal Procedure, or A Third "Model" of the
Criminal Process, 79 YALE L.J. 359 (1969). Therein Griffiths isolates intimacy as
one of the key factors essential in helping the offender obtain self-control. Rather
than exile the offender, the chief result of current criminal procedure, Griffiths im-
plores the unification of criminal law, procedure and penology so that the offender
can become a meaningful part of the community. Id. at 380. See also A. MASLOW,
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The express terms of Rule 402 portray such a proceeding. The
hearing, as perceived by the rule, is in harmony with the concept that
the defendant be a knowing and willing participant and that the trial
judge be certain that the defendant's participation is a result of a know-
ledgeable and voluntary decision. If the defendant does not view the
decision to participate as one resulting from such conditions, the ensu-
ing intercourse will be tainted. Thus a great onus is rightfully placed on
the trial judge.149
A Model for Interaction
At present there is no sequence of events required by the rule.
The factual basis as well as the negotiation agreement may be discussed
after the plea is accepted. 150 There is no purposefully constructed pro-
cedure to be institutionalized. The authors believe that this proceeding
must flow in a coherent and logical manner; coherent and logical to the
defendant as well as to the officers of the court. The following is a model
for a patterned guilty plea proceeding that the authors feel will effectuate
the aforementioned goals of rehabilitation, accuracy, certainty, fairness
and efficiency. It will also enable the trial judge to create a mileau
that is conducive to open and honest intercourse.
I. Preliminary Interview
Assuming that the judge has been notified that the defendant desires
to plead guilty, the judge should first ascertain some basic information
about the defendant. He should acquaint himself with some essential
elements of the defendant's personal history: name, age, occupation, ed-
ucation, place of birth, etc. This will better enable the judge to gear the
proceedings toward the level of understanding of that particular defendant.
I1. The Defendant: Having the Benefit of a Considered Decision
Initially, the defendant must be given a meaningful opportunity to
decide whether he or she wants to take part in the proceeding and thus
forego the trial process. Before the court can consider whether the de-
TOWARD A PSYCHOLOGY OF BEING (1968); S. PUTNEY & G. PUTNEY, THE ADJUSTED
AMERICAN (1964); D. RIESMAN, THE LONELY CROWD (1961).
149. In the terms of the rule, "to personally address the defendant in open court.
150. People v. Talbot, 9 Ill. App. 3d 688, 292 N.E.2d 561 (3d Dist. 1973) (ac-
ceptance of a negotiated agreement). See text accompanying notes 91-96 supra re-
garding the acceptance of a factual basis.
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fendant's decision to plead guilty is voluntary, the defendant must be
knowledgeable of the consequences of such an action. It is the duty of
the court, as the personification of the group's highest ranking authority,
to explain to the defendant, in language on a par with his or her ken, the
consequences of the plea. Since many defendants are of a certain socio-
economic class,"" the most effective and efficient method of commu-
nication would be to use patterned statements' 5 2 tailored to those defend-
ants.'1 3  Based on the institutional reactions of the circuit and appellate
court judges and their responses to the sampling, there is a great deal of
support for such a proposition. Of those surveyed by the authors, 4 of
the 5 appellate court judges, 83% of the circuit court judges, 100% of
the state's attorneys, and 67% of the public defenders favored implemen-
tation of patterned instructions: an overall total of 82%.
These admonitions should contain an amount of information sufficient
for a defendant to knowingly, and thus voluntarily, assume the conse-
quences of a guilty plea.' 54 In effect, this means that an educational ex-
151. There is much evidence that most of the people who pass through the crim-
inal courts are of the same socio-economic, and therefore educational, level. Such
can even be derived from the fact that of the 212 guilty plea appeals, only 35 de-
fendants were represented by private counsel, and one must assume that some were
appointed.
152. The authors have purposely avoided the use of the term "admonition" for
these purposes due to its negative connotation. Webster's unabridged dictionary de-
fines admonition as "a warning or caution against specific faults, or a reprimand."
Such is not the purpose of 402(a)(1)-(4).
153. Before constructing a patterned statement, a great deal of effort should be
expended in understanding the defendant. Projects should be set up to study how
the different inquisitorial models cope with this communications problem. The proj-
ects should focus on such models as the continental system, successful juvenile adju-
dication and preliminary hearing procedures.
At present an analogous inquiry is being pursued at the DePaul University College
of Law. Based on an unpublished paper by Jeffrey M. Libit, JUROR COMMUNICA-
TON: A FUNCTIONAL SEMANTIC APPROACH TO THE ANALYSIS OF JUROR INSTITU-
TIONAL LANGUAGE (1973), a study of the effect of the language of the Illinois Pat-
terned Instructions on jurors is being conducted. More of these studies are neces-
sary to verify the truth of many legally sanctioned procedures that are based solely
on unverified assumptions.
154. This rebirth of the inquisitorial model is conditional. Unlike the conti-
nental system, the defendant here may choose whether he or she will pursue a plea
of guilty. Of course such a statement must be tempered by the fact of plea bargain-
ing, but in most cases, to say that the process is coercive, discounts the fact that
the defendant's alternative is an expensive trial with no assurance of a verdict of
not guilty. It is usually one of the defense counsel's tactics of last resort, and in
some cases indicates the state's perception of the strength or weakness of its case.
Nevertheless, it is well established that a defendant is not considered coerced if he is
provided with sufficient knowledge of the consequences. North Carolina v. Alford,
400 U.S. 25 (1970); People v. Province, 16 Ill. App. 3d 314, 306 N.E.2d 66 (5th
Dist. 1974) (abstract). Also, a plea is not considered involuntary when the defendant
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change between the judge and the defendant must take place. Like
any successful learning process, it must not be one-sided. The court
should not only set forth clear statements of the consequences of plead-
ing guilty but also should actively solicit responses to be assured of the
defendant's understanding. 155
There is certain information that must be conveyed to the defendant
so that an intelligent and considered decision may be made. The de-
fendant must be given sufficient information about the charges so that
he or she can relate them to the facts. Thus, merely stating the name
of the charge or reciting the statement would be inadequate. A patterned
statement should be so structured as to allow the judge to insert the name
of the charge followed by a statement of the essential elements. To make
certain that the defendant, in his or her own mind, relates the legal ele-
ments with the particular facts of the situation, the judge should provide
a brief, factual, hypothetical example that would constitute a violation of
the offense in question.
The sampling regarding this statement disclosed the following opinions:
Enumerate that which you would include in your definition of the nature
of the charge: (check one or more) (answer by percentage)
Cir.
Ct. SA PD Total
a. reading the indictment 70 69 75 72
b. stating just the name of the charge 37 15 19 30
c. reading the statute 33 8 50 32
d. stating the essential elements 79 62 94 80
e. reading the statutory defenses 26 15 56 31
f. relating that which has been checked 21 15 69 31
above to the facts
Of the total number of 402 issues raised and discussed on appeal, 12%
were 402(a)(1), nature of the charge, issues. The continued appellate
litigation in this area could easily be resolved by a patterned statement.
No court has gone further than to require a statement of the essential
elements; thus the suggested procedure would not be in any way offen-
sive to prior appellate court decisions. The authors have rejected as in-
adequate the mere reading of the indictment, as the indictment is couched
claims that he would have gotten a higher sentence if he went to trial. People v.
Ferguson, 15 Ill. App. 3d 773, 305 N.E.2d 366 (1st Dist. 1973) (abstract); People
v. Singleton, 4 Ill. App. 3d 46, 280 N.E.2d 260 (5th Dist. 1972); People v. Che-
shier, 3 Ill. App. 3d 523, 278 N.E.2d 93 (3rd Dist. 1972). For the state's attorney
or judge to state that a higher sentence would be imposed if a trial were requested,
however, must be considered so unconscionable as to deprive the defendant of a rea-
sonable opportunity to make a voluntary decision.
155. Accord, People v. Abernathy, 16 IlL. App. 3d 909, 307 N.E.2d 178 (2d




in language that in no way can be considered fathomable by the average
defendant.
The defendant must then be made aware of the penal consequences
of his or her plea. This is one of the most crucial considerations of the
guilty plea process. For the defendant, all the choices boil down to:
how much can I get? Rule 402(a)(2), however, informs the defendant
of but the bare minimum penal consequences of tendering a plea: "the
minimum and maximum prescribed by law [and some jurisdictions do not
require an explanation of the term "indeterminate"], including, when
applicable, the penalty ,to which the defendant may be subjected be-
cause of prior convictions or consecutive sentences." 156
It is the authors' belief, well supported by the sampling, that this
statement should include more. It is in regard to the consequences of a
guilty plea that a patterned statement can be most effective. In a run-
ning monologue, the patterned statement should set out at least the fol-
lowing: (1) that if the plea is accepted, a sentence must be imposed;
(2) that if a trial is pursued and the defendant is found not guilty, he or
she will be set free and that charge cannot be reinstated; (3) that if a
plea is accepted, the charges dropped or accepted cannot be later rein-
stated; (4) the statutory minimum and maximum for each charge along
with examples if the maximum is indeterminate; (5) that, if more than
one charge is involved, they can run consecutively or concurrently (when
applicable); (6) that there is a possibility of probation (when applicable);
1(7) that the present status of probation (when applicable) will be re-
voked, probation would no longer be possible and that an extra sen-
tence of "X" number of years could be added to the new sentence; and
(8) that the defendant has the right to have a pre-sentence investigation
made and to present evidence in aggravation and mitigation. 157  Of
course, this statement, like patterned jury instructions, would be shaped
by the facts, and it is the responsibility of the trial judge to verify the
defendant's understanding of these statements. A breakdown of responses
to supplying these alternative statements is set out in Appendix D.
In language that the defendant could comprehend, the recital of a
clear scenario of the trial package would better enable him or her
to plead knowingly. A patterned statement would have the effect of re-
ducing the number of "penal consequences" appeals which currently con-
stitute 12% of the issues raised in 402 appeals. Application of this com-
prehensive statement would also evidence a respect for the defendant as
156. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. IlOA, § 402(a) (2) (Supp. 1972).
157. See Appendix D, pp. 96-99 infra, for a full breakdown of responses to the
questionnaires' request.
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an individual. By so informing the defendant, the trial judge could hu-
manize the proceeding and convey a sense of worth: that the defendant is
able to make a rational choice when given the opportunity. Such is a
significant factor in dismantling a mechanistic approach to human rela-
tions while imparting a sense of justice.
It has been held that the court need not admonish the defendant of the
minimum or maximum at a probation revocation hearing. 158 Of all the
questions in this sampling, that issue produced one of the most decisive
responses. When asked whether an admonition as to the possible sen-
tence to be imposed on a defendant pleading guilty to a charge of viola-
tion of probation should be given, all of the appellate court judges re-
ponding to that question, 95% of the circuit court judges, 54% of the
state's attorneys and 94% of the public defenders favored the admoni-
tion: a total of 87%. Since the standard of proof required to substan-
tiate a violation of probation is less than that for conviction of the very
same offense, there is no reason why the defendant should not be af-
forded the same knowledge of the penal consequences as one pleading
to the substantive offense. When pleading guilty to a violation of proba-
tion, the potential consequences are usually greater since the defendant
may later be prosecuted for the substantive offense as well.
The final information, necessary for the defendant to make a knowing
plea, revolves around the consequences of the choice: what will be
waived. The rule requires that the defendant be informed of the fact
that he or she has "the right to plead not guilty or to persist in that plea
if it has already been made, or to plead guilty; and . . . that if he
pleads guilty there will not be a trial of any kind, so that by pleading
guilty he waives the right to trial by jury and the right to be confronted
with the witnesses against him."'159
To tender a voluntary plea the court must be sure that the defendant
understands that which he or she is waiving. It is the authors' conten-
tion that a description of the criminal trial process, understandable to the
particular defendant, must be given. A patterned statement should con-
tain a brief yet complete description of at least the following: the right to
a bench or jury trial; the right to be proven guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt; the right to counsel at trial, and free counsel if indigent; the right
to remain silent; the right to select a jury; the right to subpoena witnesses;
the right to cross examine witnesses; the right -to present any legal or fac-
tual defense; and the right to plead not guilty. A breakdown of responses
158. People v. Evans, 3 I11. App. 3d 435, 278 N.E.2d 401 (2d Dist. 1972).
159. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. ll0A, §§ 402(a)(3)-(a)(4) (Supp. 1972).
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to the inclusion of these various rights in a penal consequences statement
is provided in Appendix D. It should be noted here that over 75% of
the responses consistently favored their inclusion.
Appeals relating to waiver of rights (402(a)(3 ) and (a)(4)) issues
equalled approximately 16% of the total issues raised. The application of a
patterned statement would therefore deal with what is now 40% of
of the issues raised on appeal.' 60 Many of these various rights, however,
have been included in some trial judges' admonitions-the Criminal
Bench Book for Trial Judges suggests that many of these rights be ex-
plained, i.e. the right to jury or bench trial, right against self-incrimina-
tion, etc. 161 The Bench Book, however, is not binding as an approved
patterned statement would be. Thus, the Bench Book has not the ef-
fect of institutionalizing a uniform procedure.
One of the reasons for inconsistent application of the rule's subsections
(402(a)(1)-(4)) is the fact that the appellate courts have held that, in
light of many records, it is not reversible error and it is substantial com-
pliance for a trial court to omit an admonition regarding one entire
subsection. 1 2 Those interpretations tend to lessen any hope of institu-
tionalizing the rule. Cognizant of this fact, Judge Thomas J. Moran of the
Second District Court of Appeals has suggested that the rule be restruc-
tured "by inserting after the word 'with' in the opening sentence, the
words 'each of'" thus changing the rule to read:
In hearings on pleas of guilty, there must be substantial compliance with
each of the following:
The authors agree that this minor change of wording is a necessary step
toward the evolution of a more accurate and certain guilty plea pro-
ceeding. 168
160. Of the 212 cases, 12% were 402(a)(1), 12% were 402(aX2) and 16% were
402(a)(3)-(aX4).
161. The right against self-incrimination is part of the Boykin package, and is
so noted in the Committee Comments to Rule 402. The appellate courts, however,
have not considered the omission of that admonition to be sufficient grounds
for reversal. People v. Fair, 17 Ill. App. 3d 109, 308 N.E.2d 162 (1st Dist. 1974);
People v. Peterson, 16 Ill. App. 3d 1025, 307 N.E.2d 405 (3d Dist. 1974).
162. People v. Campbell, 13 Ill. App. 3d 237, 300 N.E.2d 568 (1st Dist. 3d Div.
1973) (402(b) omission); People v. Shepard, 10 Ill. App. 3d 739, 295 N.E.2d 310
(1st Dist. 1973) (402(aX4) omission); People v. Williams, 9 Ill. App. 3d 401, 292
N.E.2d 437 (1st Dist. 1972) (402(a)(4) omission); People v. Hartman, 6 Inl. App.
3d 543, 285 N.E.2d 600 (2d Dist. 1972) (402(a)(2) omission); People v. Mule, 6 Ill.
App. 3d 97, 283 N.E.2d 693 (2d Dist. 1972) (abstract) (402(a)(4) omission); People
v. Reed, 3 Ill. App. 3d 293, 278 N.E.2d 524 (1st Dist. 1971) (402(a)(2) omission).
163. There is some authority in support of Judge Moran's suggestion. See, e.g.,
People v. Green, 12 Ill. App. 3d 418, 299 N.E.2d 535 (4th Dist. 1973) (4 02 (a)(1)
and 402(c) must be determined separately),
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III. The Trial Court-Acceptance of an Adequate Plea
This final phase of the proceeding is most significant. It is here that
the trial judge must determine to his satisfaction whether the defendant
is guilty as charged and if the defendant is pleading voluntarily. The
authors envision this stage as the point where the judge and counselors
can have the most positive effect on the defendant. If handled correctly,
the different perspectives of the participants can help sort out the events
and factors that precipitated the charge. It is the purpose of this sec-
tion to lay a foundation for a more humanistic approach toward the "ad-
judication" of a defendant. Needless to say, effective direction of
group interaction is a learned skill; however, if the "law" is to solve prob-
lems it must study behavior and divine patterns from the many stories that
daily unfold before the bench.
The authors have devised an open-ended plan for the acceptance of
pleas to allow the counselors and the judge to freely interact. Thus,
planned or patterned statements would serve no useful purpose. Rather
a structure of events has been devised to assure 1) that the facts are
honestly disclosed, 2) that the plea is uncoerced, 3) that there is full dis-
closure of any agreements and 4) that there will have been complete and
open discussion of the circumstances and consequences, when the proceed-
ing has been completed.
Before this prototype procedure is disclosed, it is necessary to discuss
the relationship of the determination of voluntariness to the finding of a
factual basis. Voluntariness deals with the freedom of choice of the
defendant. There are two forms of involuntariness. The first is the
most obvious type: overt threats, promises or coercion that cause a defend-
ant to plead rather than select a trial.'1 4  The second is a more insidi-
ous form of coercion for it deals with facts which, if understood and ap-
preciated by the defendant, would have caused him not to plead guilty.
This second form of involuntariness may be exemplified by the situation
where the "defendant may not completely understand what mental states
and acts constitute commission of the offenses charged or that he has
a valid defense to the charge."' 165 The only way to flush out the truth
in these situations is to have a complete discussion of the circumstances
surrounding the commission of the offense. 166 To make a competent
164. There is also the possibility that an apparently rational defendant "may en-
ter a false plea in the hope of achieving some goal, as where an innocent defendant
is seeking to protect another person." ABA STANDARDS, supra note 6, at 31.
165. Id.
166. It is for this reason that the authors believe that the defendant's participa-
tion is a necessity. Accord, ABA STANDARDS, supra note 6, at § 1.1a at 13. It
1974]
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finding and conduct an effective and efficient hearing, a full disclosure
of the factors is imperative. This will serve to assure that the defendant
relates the facts to the law from the nature of the charge statement,167
and also will verify that the defendant is being properly represented.' 68
Thus, a proper finding of voluntariness is very much dependent on a full
is also one reason why the practice of allowing a stipulation to the factual basis
is unsound.
When asked if stipulating to a factual basis is proper, 92% of the state's attorneys
and 50% of the public defenders responded in the affirmative. Unfortunately, the
wording of this question makes the responses less significant as the phrase-stipulate
to a factual basis-could be interpreted to mean either a statement that the facts
are stipulated with no actual recital of what occurred or a statement of the facts
recited into the record and a statement by the defendant verifying it. The more
likely interpretation is the second. Unfortunately, in the authors' view, 70% of the
circuit court judges felt that nothing more than a stipulation should be required to
show compliance with determining the factual basis.
The case law has gone so far as to find a proper factual basis for a plea where
the record contained no detailed facts, but did include a self-serving statement by
the trial judge that he had made a finding of a factual basis. People v. Doe, 6
111. App. 3d 799, 286 N.E.2d 645 (1st Dist. 1972). Contra, People v. Walraven, II
Ill. App. 3d 1085, 297 N.E.2d 198 (3d Dist. 1973).
"Substantial compliance" has been interpreted to allow the appellate courts to up-
hold a factual basis determination by viewing the record as a whole. People v.
Freeman, 15 111. App. 3d 100, 303 N.E.2d 598 (5th Dist. 1973); People v. Barr,
14 Il. App. 3d 742, 303 N.E.2d 202 (1st Dist. 1973). Courts have also gone so
far as to assume voluntariness when the defendant has been sufficiently admonished
pursuant to 402(a). People v. Ellis, 16 Il. App. 3d 282, 306 N.E.2d 53 (2d Dist.
1974), leave to appeal granted, (filed May 16, 1974, no. 72-216).
These decisions have done little in the way of reinforcing 402(c) and making
it a vehicle for a proper fact finding and voluntariness determination.
167. See McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459 (1969), cited with approval
in People v. Ingeneri, 7 Il. App. 3d 809, 811, 288 N.E.2d 550, 551 (5th Dist.
1972).
168. The phenomenon of poor representation should be a subject of particular
concern for everyone. Justice Stouder of the Third District Court of Appeals notes
that:
I think trial judges might well prefer that most of the areas covered by
402 should be left to be resolved between the defendant and his attorney.
Because the bench and bar have in the past been somewhat negligent in
the representation of those accused of crime particularly if compensation
thereof was limited or nonexistent, we have now by evolutionary means
institutionalized our awareness of these deficiencies.
The problem of poor representation extends far beyond the scope of Rule 402 and
into the heart of the system of criminal justice in Illinois: the allocation of re-
sources as well as the attitudes toward correction.
Unless Rule 402 is approached in the manner proposed herein, transcripts will
be void of the data so necessary for proper disposition of the case and appellate
review. A full record is necessary, because there are situations when the judge and
attorneys overlook facts sufficient to constitute a defense or are unaware of the law.
See, e.g., People v. Drake, No. 73-67 (filed Aug. 1973, 2d Dist.) (where defense
counsel and trial judge stated that intoxication is not a defense where there is evi-
dence of intoxication).
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factual basis discussion. 169
Once one accepts that notion, another obstacle must be hurdled.
According to appellate court interpretation, a factual basis can be de-
termined after actual acceptance of the plea.' 70 The courts have ruled
that according to 402(c), final judgment means that the factual basis
can be established any time up to sentencing. Thus, a factual basis can
be established in a hearing in aggravation and mitigation held days after
the plea was actually accepted. This interpretation is an unfortunate
blow to the proper institutionalization of a guilty plea procedure at the
trial level as well as to the positive experiences that can be derived from
a meaningful hearing.
There is a great deal of support for a restructuring of 402(c) by the ju-
diciary. One reason is that, presently, 402(c) is functionally and theoretic-
ally incongruent with the way the proceedings were meant to operate.171
In order to determine whether this interpretation was well received, the
authors asked the respondents of the sampling to note when they
thought the factual basis should be determined. The overall percentage
results were: 73%-before any form of acceptance of the plea, 14%
-any time before the mittimus is authorized ("final judgment"-what is
now the interpretation), 27%-when determining if the defendant under-
stands the nature of the charge and 14%-when determining if the de-
fendant's plea is voluntary.' 7 2  Thus three of the four choices required
the trial judge to determine the factual basis before any adjudication of
guilt. Only 14% of the respondents concur with the present interpreta-
tion of 402(c). It is for these reasons that the authors have purposely
structured a model that would disallow such a practice.
In order to properly facilitate this third phase, the authors believe that
the state's attorney should be required to submit, after the patterned
statements and responses discussed above, but prior to this phase, a writ-
169. Responding to whether it is possible for the trial judge to determine if a
plea is voluntary before a factual basis is determined, 77% of the state's attorneys
and 56% of the public defenders answered yes. It is the authors' belief that the
term voluntary was not defined as broadly by the respondents as stated herein.
170. People v. Williams, 16 Ill. App. 3d 199, 306 N.E.2d 678 (2d Dist. 1973);
People v. Abel, 10 Ill. App. 3d 210, 291 N.E.2d 841 (4th Dist. 1973); People v.
Fowler, 8 Il. App. 3d 927, 290 N.E.2d 618 (5th Dist. 1972); People v. Warship,
6 Ill. App. 3d 461, 285 N.E.2d 224 (2d Dist. 1972). See also People v. Brooks,
55 Ill. 2d 495, 304 N.E.2d 283 (1973).
17i. See, e.g., People v. Edmonds, 15 Il1. App. 3d 1073, 305 N.E.2d 346 (5th
Dist. 1973); People v. Warship, 6 Ill. App. 3d 461, 466, 285 N.E.2d 224, 229 (2d
Dist. 1972) (Moran, J., dissenting).
172. The reason why the total is over 100% is because some respondents
checked more than one selection,
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ten statement describing to the court the facts that would have been
proved had a trial been requested. The judge should first ask whether,
now that the statements and acknowledgments have been completed,
the defendant still desires to plead guilty. If the answer is in the affirma-
tive, the trial judge should then be required to elicit the facts of the occur-
rence from the defendant. Careful scrutiny of the accounts of the state
and the defendant would serve to verify the validity of each report and
assure that the defendant's plea is truly voluntary.
When placed in this unfamiliar setting, the external pressure tends to
cause more truthful responses. Thus if conducted properly, the hearing
will better enable the judge to discern any factual or legal defenses and
appraise the defendant of their existence. The judge will also be bet-
ter able to discover if the defendant has been coerced into the plea.' 78
Once the defendant completes the description of the occurrence, the
judge should be required to relate the facts to the law for both the record
and the parties. A verbal agreement by all parties that the statement is
correct should then be included in the record. Then the judge should in-
quire about the status of any plea agreements. If the parties have nego-
tiated an agreement, the court should require that all the terms and rea-
sons for the agreement be disclosed and made of record. At this time
section (d)(2) of Rule 402 becomes fully operative.
Once all these relevant facts are elicited, the judge should again ask
the defendant if he or she still wishes to plead guilty. If so, the judge
should state whether the plea will be accepted and why. If the plea is not
the result of an agreement, it should not be conditionally accepted. Only
when there is an agreement should the acceptance of a plea be condi-
tioned on evidence heard in aggravation and mitigation. If the plea is
not a result of an agreement, the defendant should be told of his right
to present evidence in aggravation and mitigation and to have a pre-
sentence investigation report compiled.' 74
173. See People v. Mims, 10 Ill. App. 3d 147, 294 N.E.2d 32 (1st Dist. 1973)
(abstract) (where the defendant contended that his private counsel stated that he
would not represent him unless he pleaded guilty).
174. If a uniform gulty plea proceeding, like the one posed herein, is adopted,
there would be less of a reason to further restructure Rule 402. The authors feel,
however, that if restructuring is considered, section (c) should be revamped to pro-
vide the following:
(c) (1) Prior to the hearing, the State's Attorney shall submit, in writing,
an offer of proof reciting that which the State would have proven
had there been a trial.
(2) Following the admonishments pursuant to section (a), the Court
shall personally address the defendant in open court and deter-
mine if there is a factual basis for the acceptance of the plea.
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This suggested patterned guilty plea procedure should have the effect
of almost totally eliminating appeals that arise from 402(a), while de-
creasing the number of appeals arising from 402(b) and (c), due to the
fact that the findings should be more elaborate. 175 Since the average guilty
plea, on appeal, consumes a total of between 12 and 20 hours of re-
search, brief and opinion writing, and argument, 176 the decrease of ap-
peals would inevitably result in a reallocation of resources so necessary
to alleviate the burdensome caseload of all concerned.
There is a justified concern that patterned statements would result in a
mechanical proceeding. The proceeding described herein requires that
only those statements that are intended to educate the defendant of the
consequences of the plea be strictly administered. It is also required
that they be in the jargon best suited for the average defendant. There
is a great deal of latitude in the balance of the proceeding due to the fact
that each situation and defendant is different. The propriety of the
trial judge's factual basis and voluntariness findings will not be barred
from attack since appellate review would still be available as a viable
method for affirmation and modification. This procedure, however, en-
visions a decrease in appeals because of the greater visibility of a more
embellished dialogue among the participants.
What is and should be the root of concern is not these procedures but
the people who implement them. Ambivalent participants end the pro-
ceeding before it begins. The strength of the suggested model is that it
presents an orderly progression of events which should, if forthrightly im-
plemented, be perceived as fair and legitimate while allowing the group
to interact in a meaningful sense. For the experience to be meaningful
to the defendant, the proceeding must be perceived as part of the vehicle
of rehabilitation. To view the encounter as one solely for the purposes
of retribution and stigmatization is of questionable moral as well as
practical worth. 177
REFLECTION
The changes, of almost a technical nature, suggested herein are ob-
viously not extreme. In fact, they are merely a refinement: a result of
(3) The factual basis determination must be made prior to any form
of acceptance of the plea.
175. To date, issues appealed on the grounds of a violation of 402(b)-(c) have
equalled 35% of the issues raised on appeal.
176. These are rough figures derived from the responses to the questionnaires.
177. Schwartz & Skolnick, Two Studies of Legal Stigma, THE OTHER SInE 103
(H. Becker ed., 1964) ("the indirect effects of sanctions can be powerful, that they
can produce unintended harm or unexpected benefit, and . . . the results are related
1974]
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the natural aging process of judicial interpretation. What is most signifi-
cant about the suggested procedure is that it is constructed with an
awareness of the need for discretion so that a concerned, experienced and
knowledgeable judge will best be able to guide a meaningful guilty plea
to fruition.
The scope of judicial inquiry has always been considered to encompass
those factors that will most effectively aid in arriving at a just resolution.
This end requires that a fair and final solution be found. The high rate
of recidivism caused by, among other things, reinforced anti-social beha-
vior and rejection by the greater society must cause the judge to widen
the perimeters of his courtroom. As the knowledge and understanding
of man increases, so will the dimension of theories about human exist-
ence and behavior. These expanded and deepened concepts of man,
his behavior and rationale are now in the process of extensive verifica-
tion and embellishment. Sources of this regard, as well as continuing
research, proliferate.
In light of these profound perspectives, what is just, in terms of a
proper and real resolution, is no longer a simple prescription. The
American's complex physical and psychological interdependence in an age
of unprecedented high population density is clearly mirrored in the crimi-
nal courts. Instead of absolving itself from the responsibility of construct-
ing a just resolution by reflecting the onus back onto the defendant, the
judiciary must become involved. And if any real success is to be achieved,
it cannot be done without the help of the trial judge. Although there
are some technical changes in the guilty plea procedure in Illinois that are
necessary, the most meaningful alteration must come from within each
member of the judiciary, as a result of the embracing of institutional
values that emphasize an ethic of multifarious understanding and exper-
tise. The inculcation of such values would, thus, better enable the ap-
pellate courts to sit as purviewers of the sophistication and technique of
skilled and experienced judges, using their advantageous position in so-
ciety's best interest. 17s
Edward Albert*
Richard Wimmer* *
to officially unemphasized aspects of the social context in which the sanctions are
administered. Id. at 105).
178. The authors wish to gratefully thank those judges and attorneys who, in
response to the questionnaires, evidenced the understanding of the great value of
self-criticism.
* Mr. Albert, a member of the New York Bar, was Survey Editor of the De
Paul Law Review, 1973-74.
** Mr. Wimmer, a member of the Illinois Bar, was an Associate Editor of the
De Paul Law Review, 1973-74.
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In hearings on pleas of guilty, there must be substantial compliance with the
following:
(a) Admonitions to Defendant. The court shall not accept a plea of guilty
without first, by addressing the defendant personally in open court, informing him
of and determining that he understands the following:
(1) the nature of the charge;
(2) the minimum and maximum sentence prescribed by law, including,
when applicable, the penalty to which the defendant may be sub-
jected because of prior convictions or consecutive sentences;
(3) that the defendant has the right to plead not guilty, or to persist in
that plea if it has already been made, or to plead guilty; and
(4) that if he pleads guilty there will not be a trial of any kind, so that
by pleading guilty he waives the right to a trial by jury and the
right to be confronted with the witnesses against him.
(b) Determining Whether the Plea is Voluntary. The court shall not accept a
plea of guilty without first determining that the plea is voluntary. If the tendered
plea is the result of a plea agreement, the agreement shall be stated in open court.
The court, by questioning the defendant personally in open court, shall confirm the
terms of the plea agreement, or that there is no agreement, and shall determine
whether any force or threats or any promises, apart from a plea agreement, were
used to obtain the plea.
(c) Determining Factual Basis for Plea. The court shall not enter final judgment
on a plea of guilty without first determining that there is a factual basis for the plea.
(d) Plea Discussions and Agreements. When there is a plea discussion or plea
agreement, the following provisions, in addition to the preceding paragraphs of this
rule, shall apply:
(1) The trial judge shall not initiate plea discussions.
(2) If a tentative plea agreement has been reached by the parties which
contemplates entry of a plea of guilty in the expectation that a
specified sentence will be imposed or that other charges before the
court will be dismissed, the trial judge may permit, upon request of
the parties, the disclosure to him of the tentative agreement and the
reasons therefor in advance of the tender of the plea. At the same
time he may also receive, with the consent of the defendant, evidence
in aggravation or mitigation. The judge may then indicate to the
parties whether he will concur in the proposed disposition; and if he
has not yet received evidence in aggravation or mitigation, he may
indicate that his concurrence is conditional on that evidence being
consistent with the representations made to him. If he has indicated
his concurrence or conditional concurrence, he shall so state in open
court at the time the agreement is stated as required by paragraph
(b) of this rule. If the defendant thereupon pleads guilty, but the
trial judge later withdraws his concurrence or conditional concurrence,
he shall so advise the parties and then call upon the defendant either
to affirm or to withdraw his plea of guilty. If the defendant there-
upon withdraws his plea, the trial judge shall recuse himself.
(3) If the parties have not sought or the trial judge has declined to give
his concurrence or conditional concurrence to a plea agreement, he
shall inform the defendant in open court at the time the agreement
1. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. llOA, § 402 (1973).
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is stated as required by paragraph (b) of this rule that the court
is not bound by the plea agreement, and that if the defendant per-
sists in his plea the disposition may be different from that con-
templated by the plea agreement.
(e) Transcript Required. In cases in which the defendant is charged with a
crime punishable by imprisonment in the penitentiary, the proceedings required by
this rule -to be in open court shall be taken verbatim, transcribed, filed, and made
a part of the common-law record.
(f) Plea Discussions, Plea Agreements, Pleas of Guilty Inadmissible Under
Certain Circumstances. If a plea discussion does not result in a plea of guilty, or
if a plea of guilty is not accepted or is withdrawn, or if judgment on a plea of
guilty is reversed on direct or collateral review, neither the plea discussion nor any
resulting agreement, plea, or judgment shall be admissible against the defendant in
any criminal proceeding.
APPENDIX B
REPORTED RULE 402 ILLINOIS COURT OPINIONS1
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RESULT REV. OG 5
DIS. OP 4
1. Includes Illinois Supreme Court opinions to 56 Ill. 2d 461 and appellate
court opinions to 17 Ill. App. 3d 830.
2. Two cases do not indicate the defense counsel.
3. Five appellate cases were not clear as to whether they were 402 or 401(b)
cases.
4. Forty-nine appellate cases included in these statistics did not indicate which
specific section of 402 was considered.
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APPENDIX C
COMPARISON OF THE NUMBER OF GUILTY PLEA
CASES TO THE TOTAL NUMBER OF CRIMINAL
CASES FOR THE YEARS 1971-741
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1973
10 152 2 19
11 135 0 12
12 125 2 12
13 119 1 14
14 146 3 16
15 146 1 22
16 71 2 7
17 1 0 0
total 895 11 102
1974
16 55 1 17
17 (to p. 830) 116 1 13
total 171 2 30
APPENDIX D
PERCENTAGE ANALYSIS OF QUESTIONNAIRE RESPONSES
I. Responses relating to the purpose and effectiveness of Rule 402
Cir. Ct. St. Atty PD Total
Do you feel that Rule 402 is an
effective and fair rule as it yes-82 54 67 73
now exists? no-18 46 33 27
Do you feel that appellate court
decisions have defined and inter- yes--50 36 36 45
preted Rule 402 in such a way as to no -50 64 64 54
make its application predictable?
Do you feel that a uniform
application of a well defined
and specific guilty plea procedure yes-65 85 75 71
would significantly decrease no-35 15 25 29
the number of appeals
in this area?
If so, what would be the best
approach:
restructure the existing Rule 402 26 10 0 16
amend it with more precise definitions 13 10 42 20
amend it by including new or
expanded requirements 9 0 25 11
supply the trial judge with
patterned admonitions 83 100 67 82
Would you prefer a guilty plea process
whereby the manner in which the trial
court satisfies Rule 402 is specifically
predetermined (e.g. as to what must yes-79 92 43 73
be given to satisfy the requirement no -21 8 57 27
that the defendant be admonished as
to the nature of the charge; similar
to patterned jury instructions)?
Do you think that the proper standard
with regard to admonitions be that yes-46 83 13 45
they be directed to the knowledge and no -54 17 88 55
understanding of a reasonable person?
(A negative response here indicated that the standard should be that the admonition
be directed to the knowledge and understanding of the particular defendant.)
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II. Nature of the Charge Admonition-402(a)(1) • *
Enumerate that which you would include
in your definition of the nature of
the charge: (check one or more)
reading the indictment
stating just the name of the charge
reading the statute
stating the essential elements
reading the statutory defenses
relating that which is checked
above to the facts
III. Penal Consequences Admonition-402(a)(2)
Enumerate that which you would
include in an admonition regarding the
penal consequences of tendering a
plea of guilty: (check one or more)
that a sentence must be imposed
if the plea is accepted
that if found not guilty by a
bench or jury trial, the
defendant will be set free
that upon acceptance of a plea of
guilty the charges dropped or
accepted can not be reinstated
the statutory minimum and
maximum of each charge
that, if more than one charge,
they can run consecutively
that, if more than one charge,
they can run concurrently
the possibility of probation
the effect of this present charge
on present probationary status
when pleading to a charge of
violation of probation, the
possible sentence to be imposed
when pleading to the second crime,
the effect of probation revocation
on the total possible sentence
that if probation has been revoked,
the defendant will not be eligible
for probation upon a plea of
guilty to a second offense
where the maximum is indeterminate,
examples should be given
(e.g., 2-10, 2-20, 2-60)
possible good time per offense charged
estimate time for parole eligibility
that the defendant has the right
to present evidence in a hearing
in aggravation and mitigation
74 46 69 68
57 46 56 55
95 54 94 87
81 23 75 60
8 63 41
76 62 81 75
IV. Waiver of Rights Admonition-402(a)(3) & (a)(4)
Enumerate that which you would include
in an admonition that would explain
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would waive when pleading guilty
right to a bench trial
right to a jury trial
right to confront witnesses
right to subpena witnesses
right to present any possible
defenses, legal or factual
right to remain silent
right to a speedy trial
right to defend oneself at trial
right to be represented by an
attorney at trial
right to free public defender,
if indigent
right to select a jury
right to plead not guilty
right to be proven beyond a
reasonable doubt
right to statutory presentence
investigation report
Do you think that a written waiver
of rights and one that shows
compliance with the present rule
is sufficient in lieu of ascer-
taining the same information for the




















V. Voluntariness and Factual Basis Determinations
Do you think that the factual basis
should be determined:
(more than one was checked
by the respondents)
before any form of acceptance
of the plea 74
any time before the mittimus is
authorized (before "final judgment") 12
when determining if the defendant
understands the nature of the charge 14
when determining if the defendant's
plea is voluntary 12
Do you think that something more
than a stipulation should be required yes-30
to show substantial compliance no -70
with determining the factual basis?
VI. Plea Agreements
Do you think that it is proper for
a trial judge, upon request, to
participate in a pre-hearing
conference with the State's Attorney
and the Defense Counsel (with the
permission of the defendant)?
In such a pre-hearing conference,
do you think it is proper for the
trial judge to consider circum-
stances that would normally be
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If the trial judge does not participate
in a negotiation conference and
later, after the plea is tendered,
hears circumstances of aggravation yes-71
and mitigation and then decides to no -29
refuse to accept the agreement,
should he recuse himself?
If the trial judge refuses to
accept a plea agreement for any yes-50
reason, should the rule require that no -50
he recuse himself?
Do you believe that plea negotiations yes-80
should be made on the record? no -20
75 63 57
25 37 43
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